06 July 2026

President Díaz-Canel has confirmed that the model that Cuba is now pursuing is informed by Vietnam’s successful approach to economic development. The ‘renovation’ or ‘innovation’ process known as Đổi Mới  enabled the southeast Asian nation to develop from the 1980’s on, a successful and vibrant economy.

Adopted by Vietnam’s Communist Party from 1986 onwards, it enabled the country to transition from a centrally planned command economy to a ‘socialist-oriented market economy,’ lifting the country out of poverty and opening it to foreign investment from the US and many other nations.

In outline, the process gave farmers long-term land use rights, allowed the sale of their produce for  personal profit, and rapidly turned Vietnam into a major rice exporter. It also legalised private ownership of small businesses and opened the country to global markets and foreign direct investment. As is the case of Cuba’s recently announced economic reforms (See Cuba Briefing 22 June 2026), it also introduced budget constraints on state-owned enterprises, removed state subsidies, and created a form of privatisation that encouraged efficiency and productivity.

Whether Cuba’s belated decision to adopt in 2026 what is now a decades-old Vietnamese approach remains to be seen. If Cuba is to succeed it will have to achieve the rapid buy-in of a population struggling to overcome day-to-day hardships caused by past economic failures, abandon its long-outdated Soviet-era socialist economic model for a new one, and find fresh ways to address  the almost daily intensification of US sanctions.

Moreover, the US Administration as represented by the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, appears to have concluded that it sees no opportunity for as long as Cuba’s present leadership remains in place, while noting it will still be for President Trump to determine Washington’s way forward

Comments made by Cuba’s leadership during a recent Council of Ministers meeting, interventions at the just ended 22nd Congress of the Communist Party affiliated Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC), and media criticism of a territorial governments’ ability to break out of their ideological mindset, suggest as reported below, that achieving at this late stage, viable socially-oriented change in Cuba may be almost impossible to achieve in the ways Vietnam did in the 1980s let alone in a way that is attractive to US investors and the Trump Administration.

Meeting with Vietnam’s Foreign Minister confirms approach

Confirmation of the newfound significance of Vietnam’s Đổi Mới economic model to Cuba came on the Presidency website.

It quoted President Díaz-Canel as having told Vietnam’s visiting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Le Hoai Trung, that discussions during their 22 June meeting “make it possible for the process of socialist construction in Vietnam to definitively become a reference for all the transformations we are carrying out in our country as part of updating our socio-economic model.” Le, was described as a special envoy of the General Secretary and President of Vietnam.

The same report quoted Cuba’s Prime Minister, Manuel Marrero, as saying in relation to Cuba’s decision “to promote and accelerate a series of transformations that have been under study for a long time,” that Cuba has “studied Vietnam’s own experience extensively,” and that it is now considered “the opportune moment to take this step.”  “We are not straying from the socialist path,” Marrero said, emphasising that Cuba is now “seeking new formulas” to sustain its achievements and “strengthen our socialism.”

The official Vietnamese agency VNA separately reported that during his meetings in Havana Le Hoai Trung “presented the main theoretical and practical aspects of [Vietnam’s economic] renewal process (Đổi Mới) oriented towards socialism over the past 40 years,” detailing  the “shared socio-economic achievements attained and the results of the implementation of the Resolution of the 13th Party Congress,” held in February 2021.

VNA also noted that in his meetings in Havana, Vietnam’s Foreign Minister “outlined the objectives, [its latest] strategic guidelines and priority tasks approved by the recent fourteenth Congress to advance towards the development goals set for 2030 and 2045.” The news agency observed that during the exchanges, Cuba’s leadership “highlighted Vietnam’s economic and social progress” and its experiences accumulated during four decades of Đổi Mới as serving to provide “a valuable reference for Cuba’s economic and social modernisation process.”

Discussions involved wide range of Cuban ministers, legislators, and officials

Describing the visit by Le and an accompanying delegation as being of “enormous significance” and reflecting Vietnam’s “understanding, sensitivity and support for the Cuban people and our Revolution,” President Díaz-Canel said that the Vietnamese minister’s visit came at a time when “the Cuban Revolution is experiencing one of the most challenging moments in its history.” 

Among the topics also discussed, according to Cuban reporting, were defence preparedness, strengthening the economy, the role of mass political movements, and a communications strategy aimed at the international community, sister nations, sister governments like Vietnam’s, and for communist parties and leftist parties.

During the official visit the Vietnamese delegation met with the President of the National Assembly, Esteban Lazo, the Prime Minister, Manuel Marrero, the Secretary of Organisation of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, Roberto Morales, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bruno Rodríguez and other leading Cuban Politburo members, ministers, and officials. The meetings were described as having taken place in a fraternal atmosphere, reflecting the mutual trust, solidarity and the special character that distinguishes the historical relations between the two nation’s peoples, parties, and Governments.

During his time in Cuba, Vietnam’s Foreign Minister visited the Mariel Special Development Zone (ZEDM), Vietnamese manufacturing operations located there,  and toured areas of Pinar del Río where Vietnam is involved in rice production. Yamilé Ramos, the First Secretary of the Provincial Party there was quoted by the province’s official media as saying that there are other  areas in Pinar del Río that could be incorporated into the Vietnam-Cuba rice project.

Vietnam is the largest investor from Asia in Cuba, with projects in agri-food, basic necessities, construction materials, and renewable energy. It is also involved in joint initiatives in rice, coffee, and corn production, and is both a supplier and humanitarian donor of rice. It also has close relations and regular exchanges with the Cuban military.

06 July 2026, Issue 1320

The Caribbean Council is able to provide further detail about all the stories in Cuba Briefing. If you would like a more detailed insight into any of the content of today’s issue, please get in touch

22 June 2026

Cuba’s Communist Party and National Assembly has approved over 170 potentially far-reaching market-related economic reforms. The measures are intended in part to stimulate economic development and investment in both state and non-state enterprises.

Confirming the changes, Cuba’s leadership reaffirmed the leading role of Cuba’s Communist Party (PCC), suggesting that belatedly the country may be trying to develop an updated  socialist economic and political model closer to that of present-day Vietnam.

If well implemented the reform package formally approved on 18 June by the Cuban Parliament represents a  significant attempt at structural change.

Much of what has been agreed has been previously announced on a piecemeal basis by the Cuban leadership and reported on by Cuba Briefing. However, taken together as an integrated package the measures represent a long overdue attempt to stimulate a more market-oriented economy that might gradually restore economic growth.

The changes announced suggest a significant change in thinking. They include elements such as the authorisation of direct foreign investment in private companies and cooperatives; the establishment of private banking; new openings and incentives for foreign investment in tourism and previously closed areas of the economy; and the  ability of investors to directly hire Cuban workers.

President Díaz-Canel and other senior figures in the PCC have rejected any suggestion that the reforms respond to external pressure, instead making clear that the country’s socialist system will remain in place, albeit in an administratively revised form.

Despite this, the timing of the long overdue changes appears to have come about in part because of the severe economic pressure being exerted by the US and the increasingly uncertain and severe cumulative effect that both sanctions and Cuban economic mismanagement are now having on Cuban social stability and national coherence.

The changed approach may also reflect the fact that the most conservative part of the Cuban Communist Party and the broader leadership has accepted that to survive, the time has come to accept what the country’s liberal economists within the state system – and those previously sidelined – have been saying for several years about the need for rapid market-oriented reform.

For their part, many ordinary Cubans believe that the unusually swift political and legislative process bringing into being the reforms reflects the need to respond rapidly deteriorating social situation across the country. This has worsened significantly since the US imposed an oil embargo in January this year, and strengthened sanctions on GAESA, the military conglomerate that controls much of the Cuban economy.

The announcements of the new measures followed an unpublicised politburo meeting that led to a weeklong series of formal meetings involving an extraordinary session of the Central Committee of the PCC on 12 June, the calling of an extraordinary session of the National Assembly by the Council of State, and a formal sign-off by legislators on 18 June.

Photo credit: @AsambleaNacionalCuba https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCfNwE3eketjLnKvxwEgpHiw

22 June 2026, Issue 1319

The Caribbean Council is able to provide further detail about all the stories in Cuba Briefing. If you would like a more detailed insight into any of the content of today’s issue, please get in touch

08 June 2026

The US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, has told a US Senate hearing that for change to occur in Cuba it will be necessary that “new people take power or a new mentality is imposed.” 

“I really don’t think this system is susceptible to reform, unless new people take power or a new mentality is imposed.” “We have spoken with them and offered them what I consider necessary for the recovery of their economy,” Rubio told legislators.  

Describing Cuba as a ‘failed state’  and a threat to the US, Rubio indicated more accurately than on previous occasions that Cuba “continues to host a considerable number of intelligence facilities for gathering information on behalf of China and Russia,” rather than suggesting that China and Russia control such facilities.

Questioned about Washington’s designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, he observed that “all violent, radical, and left-wing terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere have at some point had the support of Cuba,” and obtained their initial funding from Havana.

Regarding the hardships being endured by the Cuban people, he suggested that this was because the Cuban military linked business conglomerate GAESA, which he said generated “around 70% of Cuba’s GDP,” had failed to spend the derived income on projects of benefit to Cubans, such as the country’s failing power generation and distribution system. 

Amplifying his remarks to Senators a day later, the US  Secretary of State told the House Foreign Affairs Committee how he believed, a transition might be achieved. His goal, he emphasised, was to avoid chaos. “I think we want to look at models like the Czech Republic or Poland, at how they made the transition. And one of the things they did was preserve certain institutions in their society to bring stability and longevity to the project,” Rubio explained.

Cuba, he said, has “technocrats” able to deliver economic change, but they are presently powerless. “I think there are some technocrats you can work with,” but this “becomes a little more difficult as you climb the ranks, due to the ideological leanings that some have.”

Continuing, he said: “Clearly there are individuals within the power structure who understand that what they have is not sustainable and that it must be rebuilt. But they have no power. And if they do, they don’t know how to use it.” Previously Rubio, who is of Cuban descent, has suggested that Washington’s “preference” would be “a negotiated diplomatic agreement.”

Absence of clarity about what happens next

Rubio’s remarks raise questions about how both Havana and Washington decide to take forward the sporadic now seemingly stalled exchanges they have been having.

They continue to take place against a background of speculation and lobbying by some in the US Department of War (formerly of Defence), who suggest that if Trump was to go further than the present siege – something so far he appears disinclined to do – the next point of escalation could be a limited military strike on Cuba with the objective of further ratcheting up Washington’s leverage. 

However, there is also an awareness among senior US officials with a long-term  understanding of Cuban dynamics that any such action could spark a migration crisis with Cubans seeking to flee by sea or attempt to enter the US naval base at Guantanamo. There is also a concern that should any attempt at change by Washington be undertaken without the support of Cuba’s junior ministers and senior technocratic officials in lower tiers of the Cuban administration, Cuba could rapidly become unstable and ungovernable. Such an outcome, it is argued, would additionally cause significant political problems in the US for the Trump Administration in the run up to the mid-term Congressional elections in November. 

Despite this, it is also clear that Cuba’s options are narrowing. Once sporadic street protests are becoming more common, including in Havana, Santiago de Cuba and other cities, hardship is commonplace, there are limits to  repression in a country that believes it may have to fight ‘a war of all the people,’ and the support of international allies and regional friends for Havana is unlikely to go any further than present rhetoric, humanitarian assistance, and diplomatic support. 

This suggests, if it is not already too late, that it would be in Havana’s interest to rapidly free its potentially dynamic private sector, divest many of the areas in which GAESA  operates making its entities subject to transparency and taxation for social benefit, and to genuinely open the country to much needed foreign investment, particularly in relation to utilities and infrastructure. Any pragmatic change of this kind could enable the emergence of a more forward-looking political leadership enabling a reduction in the power of the state so that the country as a whole and its people see living standards improve in ways that enable many of the social gains experienced in the past to be restored.

Whether Cuba’s still cohesive collegiate, ideologically-oriented leadership is able or prepared to take such bold steps, or the US can design with others on the island rather than in Florida, a viable, realistic, and lasting response of economic benefit to both nations remains to be seen.

Photo credit: https://x.com/SecRubio/media?lang=en

08 June 2026, Issue 1318

The Caribbean Council is able to provide further detail about all the stories in Cuba Briefing. If you would like a more detailed insight into any of the content of today’s issue, please get in touch

11 May 2026

The Trump administration has intensified its pressure on Cuba, placing new sanctions on investment and trade with key sectors of the island’s economy.

On 1 May President Trump signed an Executive Order seeking to sanction companies and individuals anywhere in the world at any level who are engaged in the Cuban “energy, defence and related materiel, metals and mining, financial services, or security sector of the Cuban economy.” Foreign financial institutions may also be subject to sanctions if there is evidence that they are involved in money transfers on behalf of persons subject to the new restrictions.

The widely drawn measure enables the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to include any other sector of the Cuban economy, and provides for penalties that could see assets, property, businesses, and bank accounts in the US frozen, and individuals denied  entry into the US. The US President justified the new sanctions on the basis that his Administration views Cuba as a serious threat to American national security and foreign policy.

US Treasury sanctions GAESA and Moa Nickel

Subsequently, on 7 May  the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) set a deadline of June 5, 2026, for foreign companies with business interests in Cuba to liquidate all operations involving GAESA, or any entity in which the powerful military linked conglomerate directly or indirectly owns a 50% or greater stake.  It also directly sanctioned Brigadier General Ania Lastres who heads GAESA, adding her to its list of Specially Designated Cuban Nationals.

GAESA is estimated to control over 40% of the Cuban economy in multiple linked sectors, including hotels and tourism, remittances and financial services, telecommunications, fisheries, construction, stores and supermarkets, logistics and the Mariel Special Development Zone.

At the same time, OFAC sanctioned the joint venture Moa Nickel SA for operating or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Cuban economy. In response, the Canadian parter in the venture , the mining company, Sherritt International,  ended it involvement (See Canada below).

Measure aims to encourage political and economic reforms

Following the announcement of the new measures, the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, who is also US Acting National Security Advisor, wrote on X: “Today’s sanctions demonstrate that the Trump Administration will not stand idly by while Cuba’s communist regime threatens our national security in our hemisphere. We will continue taking action until the regime implements all the necessary political and economic reforms.” ​​

Justifying the decision, the State Department said that “the Trump Administration is taking decisive action to protect US national security and deprive the communist regime and the Cuban armed forces of access to illicit assets.”

The new US regulations come as media reports quoting unnamed White House sources suggest that while Washington’s principal focus remains on finding a diplomatic solution,  including the departure of some senior figures, it is also considering a military operation aimed at “regime change.”

Latest OFAC Cuba guidelines create new uncertainties

In an apparent attempt to create uncertainty among foreign investors and those involved in trade and the provision of services for Cuba, OFAC noted that foreign actors who maintain business relationships with the Cuban government are at risk of sanctions. It noted, however, that the  executive order “does not automatically impose sanctions on all persons who operate or have operated” in the designated sectors.

In a statement, OFAC stressed that the US government does not intend to sanction foreign individuals and recommends that entities unable to liquidate their operations before the deadline contact it.

In doing so it warned, however, that sanctions will be imposed against foreign individuals or entities that “are involved in specific harmful activities related to Cuba.” It also noted that it will seek to monitor foreign persons or companies that “act on behalf of or representing the Government of Cuba,” as well as those “complicit in serious human rights violations or acts of corruption related to Cuba”.

OFAC noted that permission granted under General License No 1, which guarantees that some economic activities already permitted will not be disrupted by the new sanctions, made clear that “persons subject to US jurisdiction remain prohibited from engaging in transactions with GAESA, including in connection with the winding up of a foreign person’s activities with GAESA, unless separately authorised by OFAC.”

The executive order can be accessed at:  https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/05/imposing-sanctions-on-those-responsible-for-repression-in-cuba-and-for-threats-to-united-states-national-security-and-foreign-policy/

The OFAC guidance can be found at:  https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/added/2026-05-07

The State Department announcement  can be found at: https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/05/u-s-sanctions-target-cubas-military-regime-elites

Cuba describes the new measures as cruel and intended to intimidate

Speaking about the new US sanctions shortly after they were announced, President Díaz-Canel described them as “cruel,” and “a unilateral aggression against a nation and a population whose only ambition is to live in peace, masters of their destiny and without the pernicious interference of US imperialism.” The measures exacerbated, he said, “the already difficult situation facing our country.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the decision as “an act of ruthless economic aggression” intended to intimidate foreign governments, banks, and companies that maintain economic relations with Cuba, and as an attempt to create the conditions to justify “more dangerous actions, including military aggression.”

Rubio  justifies actions on grounds of foreign threats to US national security

Speaking  to Fox News on 27 April before the new sanctions were announced, US Secretary of State Rubio sought to explain the reason why President Trump had declared Cuba an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the US.

The designation, he said, related to US security assessments associated with Cuba’s links to foreign intelligence agencies and activities in the hemisphere which Washington considers unacceptable. “We are not going to allow a foreign military, intelligence, or security apparatus to operate with impunity 90 miles away,” Rubio said during an interview mainly relating to  the Middle East. 

Cuba, he told Fox News’ viewers, is on the one hand “a failed state,” and on the other, “a country hosting adversaries and competitors,” before noting that “the Chinese, the Russians, and others routinely use Cuba for their own purposes, just 90 miles from our shores.” This proximity, he observed, is what makes the Island “different from anything in the Middle East or anything happening in Asia. It’s literally 90 miles from Key West, just over 100 miles from Mar-a-Lago. Closer, impossible. That’s why it matters to us; that’s why it’s important,” he said.

Then, in an indication of  why Washington has so far taken a gradualist approach to negotiations and change involving the departure of some members of Cuba’s leadership, he said, “if a humanitarian collapse were to occur, it would be “bad for our country.”  The possibility of improvement, on the contrary, he observed, is contingent on “very substantial and serious economic reforms,” which are, however, impossible “with these people in charge.”

Rubio concluded by stating: “We will not allow a foreign military, intelligence, or security apparatus to operate with impunity 90 miles off the coast of the United States. That will not happen under a Trump presidency.”

Rubio’s interview came just before a US military exercise, FLEX 2026, involving the deployment of drones and other unmanned equipment took place in US territorial waters north of Cuba. The exercise served to test the integration of artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, and traditional forces in maritime operations in relation to a new Southern Command Autonomous Warfare Command  covering Central America, South America and the Caribbean.

Earlier, in the margins of the US Western Hemisphere 2026 Heads of Mission Conference held in Florida, Rubio posed with General Francis Donovan, the new head of US Southern Command, in front of a map of Cuba. The Conference focused on “U.S. efforts to counter threats that undermine security, stability and democracy in our hemisphere,” Southern Command noted in a post on X.

11 May 2026, Issue 1316

The Caribbean Council is able to provide further detail about all the stories in Cuba Briefing. If you would like a more detailed insight into any of the content of today’s issue, please get in touch

27 April 2026

The Cuban and US governments have acknowledged that senior US and Cuban officials met in Havana on 10 April.  The face-to-face discussions came after weeks of informal contact during which both sides proposed ways in which structured exchanges might take place.

Although various partisan versions of the issues discussed in Havana were initially reported by several US media outlets, State Department officials subsequently provided a more accurate read-out of Washington’s position on a non-attributable basis. 

Consequently, later media reports made clear that the initial exchanges setting out both sides starting positions were measured and respectful. The US delegation was led by so far unnamed senior officials and overseen by the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio.

27 April 2026, Issue 1315

The Caribbean Council is able to provide further detail about all the stories in Cuba Briefing. If you would like a more detailed insight into any of the content of today’s issue, please get in touch