Cuba Briefing

Díaz-Canel confirms initial exchanges are taking place with Washington

16 March 2026

16 March 2026

President Díaz-Canel has confirmed that initial exchanges are taking place with the US government. The intention, he said, is to create an agenda “to find a solution and create spaces for understanding, allowing us to move forward and away from confrontation.”

Speaking on 13 March from the Presidential Palace, Cuba’s President acknowledged that there is an ongoing process of bilateral exchanges between the two nations. Addressing Cubans and the media, he noted that the exploratory conversation had been facilitated by international actors “as in the past” when Raul Castro led Cuba’s negotiations with the Obama administration.

“These talks,” he said, “have been aimed at finding solutions through dialogue to the bilateral differences between our two nations.” Their purpose, he noted, “is, first and foremost, to identify which bilateral problems need a solution,” and to “determine the willingness of both parties to take concrete actions for the benefit of our people.” This involves, Cuba’s President said, “finding areas of cooperation through which we can confront threats, and guarantee the security and peace of both countries, as well as the security and peace of our region.”

Confirming that the exchanges are in an initial phase, he made clear that there is internal unity in in the Cuban system in relation to the process. The exchanges, he said, are being undertaken “in accordance with the consistent policy that the Cuban Revolution has defended in its history, led by Army General Raúl Castro as leader of the Revolution.”

Emphasising Cuba’s collegiate approach to strategic decision making, he said that Cuban officials recent discussions with US government representatives had involved “collegial action within the highest structures of the Party, the State, and the Government.”

Speaking about the process, Díaz-Canel said that it involves “great discretion,” is likely to be long, and “must begin by establishing contacts, creating possibilities for channels for dialogue, and fostering a willingness to engage.” All of this, he stressed, takes time. “Only then are agendas built, negotiations and conversations undertaken, and agreements reached. We are still far from this because we are in the initial phases of this process,” he told Cubans.

Cuba sets out its objectives

In his remarks, Díaz-Canel outlined three objectives for the present part of the process. These are, he said, to “determine which bilateral problems need solving; to establish possible solutions to these problems;” and to determine “if there is a willingness to take concrete actions for the benefit of our people.” This implies, he said, “identifying areas of cooperation to address threats and guarantee the security and peace of both countries.”

The exchanges with Washington, Díaz-Canel noted, involve a “very sensitive process” requiring “enormous and arduous efforts to find a solution and create spaces for understanding, allowing us to move forward and away from confrontation.” Cuba, he observed in a lengthy statement, has expressed a willingness to conduct talks based on equality and respect for the political systems of both states, and their sovereignty.

The outcome of the bilateral negotiating process, President Díaz-Canel said, will be reported to Cubans “exactly as it happens,” regardless of the speculation surrounding the issue.

Other issues also addressed

In his remarks, Díaz-Canel also addressed related issues of concern to Cubans. Speaking about the fuel and power generation crisis facing the country, Cuba’s President noted that “No fuel has come in for three months” as recent US measures had made it impossible to access fuel on the international market. Although the country had recovered more than 1,400 MW of its distributed generating capacity, this, he said, “cannot be used to meet peak energy demand due to a lack of fuel.”

Cuba’s President went on to address the impact of the US energy embargo on productivity and employment, consequent measures being introduced to relocate labour, the use of business profits to pay salaries, and the prioritisation of education, particularly in universities.

New investment opportunities coming for Cubans living overseas

On the subject of relations with Cubans abroad, a matter that may come to the fore in any detailed negotiation with the US, Díaz-Canel made clear that they have the right to participate in the country’s economic and social development and that it continues to be the government’s responsibility to “welcome them, listen to them, attend to them, and provide them with a space for participation.” In doing so he acknowledged that the number of Cubans residing abroad or extending their stay overseas has been growing, and “is significant.”

Observing that many of those who have left are professionals formed by Cuba’s educational system and maintain their cultural roots and their identity with the nation, Cuba’s President said that new measures to facilitate their participation in Cuba’s development programme are to be introduced. They will be announced soon, he told Cubans, by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment, Oscar Pérez-Oliva.

Vatican playing a role

Although not spelt out, The Vatican’s has confirmed that it has played a significant role, acting as an early intermediary between the US and Cuba. When asked about this by journalists the Holy See’s Secretary of State, Cardinal Parolin, noted that it “speaks with all interlocutors to relaunch dialogue and work for peace, as is also the case for Cuba.” The Cardinal added that “everything that had to be done has been done,” before going on to observe, “We have seen the Foreign Minister and we have taken the necessary steps always in view of a dialogue solution to the problems that exist”.

His remarks were followed by the announcement by the Cuban authorities that they would authorise the release of 51 prisoners, describing it as a gesture of goodwill towards the Vatican for Holy Week. According to two human rights NGOs, fifteen of the number released were political prisoners while the rest had been imprisoned for other offences.

US President’s remarks suggest resolution may take time

President Díaz-Canel’s remarks came at the end of a week of multiple, seemingly random Cuba-related remarks by President Trump, made to the media during unrelated events or when he was speaking about the war in the Middle East. Taken together, the US President’s comments indicate in general that “a deal” with Cuba is being considered, that talks are being led by the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, and the issue is unlikely to be addressed until the war with Iran has ended.

Addressing a White House reception for the winning 2025 US Major League soccer team, Trump appeared to make clear his timing. In a public aside to Marco Rubio, who was seated nearby, the US President said in a reference to the war with Iran: “Your next project will be Cuba. It’s waiting, but let’s finish this one first.” Then, addressing Jorge Mas, a leading Cuban-American businessman also present and who is the Managing Partner of the winning soccer team, Trump additionally sought to reassure the Cuban exile community. “It will only be a matter of time before you and many other amazing people return to Cuba,” he said.

In Miami, Trump additionally told NBC local affiliate that Cuba is interested in negotiating with Washington, and told other media outlets that a “friendly takeover” is possible. Speaking separately to Reuters about a possible deal, he said “I can see that happening. Marco Rubio is dealing on it and at a very high level,” before going on to observe that Cuba is “a nation in deep trouble and they want our help.”

Trump also confirmed to the group of Latin American leaders attending the ‘Shield of the Americas’ summit in Doral that other US officials have been involved in the recent exchanges with Cuba (Details Cuba Briefing 2 March 2026). Separately, the House Speaker Mike Johnson (R- Louisiana) in comments to the media has ruled out a military option. “I don’t think there’s a need. I don’t think there’s an appetite to put boots on the ground in Cuba. I think some of this is happening organically,” he said.

Shape of possible final deal outlined

The shape of a possible deal from a US perspective has appeared in a widely quoted article published in USA Today. The publication quoting unnamed US sources “with knowledge of the administration’s plans,” reported that Washington is seeking an economic deal involving ports, energy, and tourism, the ending of some sanctions, and will allow the Cuban leadership to remain in Cuba. Agreement could also include, according to the publication, a relaxation on US travel to Cuba.

Although the report’s sources appeared to focus on the end of any substantive negotiation, the subject of investment is believed to have been touched on during an exploration of the parameters of any more formal negotiation that may take place. USA Today’s sources additionally suggested that the new US approach to Cuba reflected President Trump’s seriousness in restoring US dominance in the Western Hemisphere.

Exiles concerned that present Cuban system may be left in place

How this approach will play with the many Cuban exiles in Miami and other locations is uncertain. Concern has been growing among Cuban American politicians, businesses, and others in the exile community who believe it is their right to return to Cuba to take control of its future, and are adamant that there should be no dialogue or contact with anyone in the existing Cuban system. Their fear, voiced on social media and on Spanish language TV and radio stations is that they are being sidelined and that Washington’s focus is not theirs. They see the Trump Administration’s emphasis on ensuring stability and security in the northern Caribbean, securing economic opportunity for all US businesses in relation to investment in critical infrastructure and tourism, oil and trade, and only at a much later date multi-party democratic elections, as not being in their political, economic, and family interests.

Opposition to negotiations that might lead to any form of continuity involving the present Cuban system of government, is seeing Cuban American representatives in Congress becoming increasingly vociferous in expressing their deep concern. “We can’t leave any Castros in power…. if they are talking to any Castro, it’s only about when they will leave, how they will leave, what the conditions will be, but not about anyone staying,” Congresswoman Maria Elvira Salazar, (R-Florida) has been quoted as saying.

In a seemingly related development that appears to be at odds with the negotiating approach being pursued by Rubio and the broader US administration at the President’s behest, first reported by the Washington Post, a decision has been taken by the US Justice Department to form a working group to examine possible federal charges against officials or entities within Cuba’s government for potential criminal offences, including narcotics trafficking, immigration, and violent repression.

Rubio walking a political tightrope

Despite his previous rhetoric and his need to keep Cuban Americans in the Republican Party onside should he wish to make a future run for President, Marco Rubio is promoting a scenario of dialogue, and gradual change. Such an approach those around him believe, would avoid a total collapse of Cuban civil society, conflict and a refugee crisis, and limit the influence of those in South Florida who believe that they are Cuba’s future, something wholly unacceptable to the present Cuban leadership.

As Cuba Briefing has previously reported, significant business interests close to President Trump see the process of change in Cuba involving first a period of economic stabilisation with US support, possibly linked to international humanitarian and economic aid; then a period of foreign external investment involving the restoration of critical infrastructure and the stimulation of productive enterprises involving Cuban non-state enterprises; and finally in a much improved and freer economy, a transition to western style democratic elections.

Photo Credit: Photo Credit: En Vivo.

16 March 2026, Issue 1312

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Washington licences sale of Venezuelan oil to Cuban private sector

2 March 2026

02 March 2026

In a measure intended to strengthen Cuba’s private sector and ease to some extent the humanitarian crisis now facing most Cubans, the US Treasury announced on 25 February that any company licensed to trade Venezuelan oil will be authorised to resell it to non-government entities in Cuba.

A notice from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) clarifying the decision, notes that such transactions must “support the Cuban people,” will allow exports for commercial and humanitarian use only in Cuba, and must not involve the Cuban government or its related bodies. The document also makes clear that non-US companies holding licences will be allowed to apply for permission to ship, but notes that the deposit of sales proceeds must be into an account controlled by the US.

The fact sheet states that to qualify for the new favourable licensing policy, requested transactions would need to be consistent with the terms and conditions of Venezuela General License (GL) 46A, though applicants need not necessarily have an established US entity. It also makes clear that such transactions cannot involve or benefit any persons or entities associated with the Cuban military, intelligence services, or other government institutions, including entities listed on the US State Department’s Cuba Restricted List.

Although the measure will not resolve the country’s power generation crisis it is likely to offer ordinary Cubans some relief from worsening problems relating to food production and distribution, and an opportunity for non-state providers of everything from transport to hospitality to function again in a limited way.

The US measure is intended to be seen as a way of ensuring the island’s small entrepreneurial private sector can play a greater role in the Cuban economy.

Although prior to the announcement some fuel has been arriving in containers on cargo ships, no significant shipment of oil has reached Cuba from overseas since early January, following the removal of Nicolás Maduro from Venezuela by US special forces, and President Trump’s tariff linked embargo on any country supplying oil to Cuba (Details Cuba Briefing 19 January 2026).

The new measure and its implications have not been commented on by the Cuban government. However, prior to the US announcement it was facilitating the private import of small quantities of oil mainly from regional sources in containerised tanks carried on cargo ships. The development followed a decision by the Cuban government last November to allow the private import of oil (See Cuba Briefing 1 December 2025), and permissions given to several non-state and some international companies operating on the island to do so.

To this end, the Cuban government held meetings with foreign businessmen and local entrepreneurs to explain how such private imports might be managed safely, and exclusively for self-consumption with resale not allowed.

Anecdotal evidence and some media reports indicate that the volume of such containerised imports remains far below the island’s national energy needs of about 100,000 barrels per day of which about 40,000 come from Cuba’s own wells. Despite this, those so far involved in bringing oil and fuel in 26,000 litre containerised ISO T11 tanks have begun to meet the immediate needs of some local businesses. The shipments are being made to the port of Mariel from where they are transported by the buyers for private use.

The US Treasury decision regarding Venezuelan oil is expected to see several US-based companies with licenses to export diesel in ISO tanks to Cuba exclusively for private customers use, move away from the regional purchasing options they have been pursuing. In addition, companies potentially able to ship to Cuba are international commodity trading firms such as Vitol and Trafigura that reportedly obtained licenses to resell Venezuelan crude in January.

02 March 2026, Issue 1311

Russia considering sending oil to Cuba

16 February 2026

16 February 2026

Cuba’s official media has reported that Russia is evaluating various energy support options for the island following the deteriorating humanitarian situation caused by a lack of fuel.

Granma suggested on 13 February that Russia has been in contact and has been discussing options. It indicated that the Kremlin “is holding talks with Cuba to finalise shipments of oil and petroleum products to the island.” In doing so, the official publication quoted a report in Izvestia, noting that “the Russian Embassy in Cuba announced that a shipment of oil and petroleum products is being prepared as humanitarian aid, which seeks to alleviate the energy crisis” facing the island.

By contrast reporting by the official Russian news agency TASS was more restrained, simply quoting the Russian presidential spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, as saying that Russia is discussing with Cuba its options for providing the island with support, but is unable “at this time” to discuss the details publicly.

Responding to a media question about possible oil shipments to Cuba, Peskov did not deny the possibility, but said “I can only reiterate what we’ve been saying at various levels all these days: we’re in contact with our Cuban friends and we’re discussing options for providing them with assistance.” When asked about the imposition or increase of tariffs by the United States on countries shipping oil to Cuba, Peskov noted that Russia would not like any escalation in the form of tariffs by the US, but “would still count on constructive dialogue and the resolution of existing problems through dialogue.” Days earlier, Peskov had told the Russian media that energy cooperation with Havana formed a “part of a historical relationship of solidarity.”

The reports suggesting Russia may be considering shipping oil on some humanitarian basis follow widespread coverage in Russia’s State media quoting a story in The Economist. The suggested that the US is preparing to provide a small shipment to Cuba of “cooking gas or diesel fuel to ensure the functioning of the water infrastructure.” Citing unnamed sources, the magazine suggested that a concession of this kind could help prevent a humanitarian crisis in Cuba and increase US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio’s, influence with Cuba and within the US Administration.

Peskov comments came after President Putin and China’s President Xi Jinping jointly expressed their intention of maintaining co-operation with Cuba and Venezuela despite US pressure on the two Caribbean nations. In a media readout of a wide-ranging bilateral video exchange that took place between the two Presidents on 4 February, the Russian presidential advisor, Yuri Ushakov, said that the two leaders “shared their perspectives on the situation surrounding Venezuela and Cuba,” and “expressed their support for maintaining the level of cooperation with Caracas and Havana” previously achieved.

Two days earlier, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, told Cuba’s Foreign Minister, Bruno Rodríguez, during a telephone conversation that Russia had a “firm commitment to continue providing Cuba with the necessary political and material support.” Cuban and Russian reporting also noted Lavrov’s reaffirmation of “its principled position regarding the unacceptability of economic and military pressure on Cuba.”

Lavrov also described Cuba as “Russia’s strategic partner in Latin America and the Caribbean, our strong supporter and ally on the international stage.” His comments were reflected in remarks made to the Russian publication Izvestia by Russia’s Ambassador to Havana, Viktor Koronelli, who noted that Russia had a continuing interest in supplying oil to Cuba.

16 February 2026, Issue 1310

Cuba condemns Trump’s decision to impose tariffs on nations sending oil to Cuba

2 February 2026

02 February 2026

Cuba’s government has condemned “in the strongest terms” the decision by President Trump to sign on 29 January an Executive Order that threatens to impose tariffs on any nation exporting “directly or indirectly” any type of oil to Cuba.

In a formal declaration, Cuba’s Government said on 30 January that the new escalation represented an attempt by the US government “to impose an absolute blockade on fuel supplies to our country.” Observing that the US decision ”constitutes a flagrant violation of international law” and that Cuba is “not subject to sanctions by the international community,“ it noted that Washington ”through blackmail, threats, and direct coercion of third countries” is attempting the “economic strangulation” of Cuba.

The international community, it wrote, “faces the unavoidable challenge of defining whether a crime of this nature can be a sign of what is to come or whether sanity, solidarity and rejection of aggression, impunity and abuse will prevail.” Cuba’s government added that nothing will break its “resolve to defend its national sovereignty and prevent Cuba from falling, once again, under US domination.”

At press time, speaking aboard Airforce One, President Trump said: “We are talking with the people of Cuba, with the highest officials in Cuba. We’ll see what happens. I think we’re going to reach an agreement with Cuba.” No further details were provided.

US Executive Order argues Cuba presents a threat to national security

According to the Executive Order a US “national emergency” exists in respect of Cuba. The Cuban government’s actions, it states, constitute “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” It argues that “The policies, practices, and actions of the Government of Cuba are designed to harm the United States and support hostile countries, transnational terrorist groups, and malign agents seeking to destroy the United States.”

The measure allows for US Commerce Secretary, Howard Lutnick, to determine whether a country sells or supplies oil to Cuba, and subsequently for the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, to decide whether and to what extent an additional tariff should be imposed on any nation’s products.

Speaking after signing the Executive Order, President Trump told reporters that “It seems it will not be able to survive.” Describing Cuba as “a failed nation” he said that “many Cuban Americans who were treated very badly and would like to return.”

The measures invoked by the order appear intended to force the Cuban government to negotiate under duress some form of transition by controlling and limiting the oil supply as a calibrated weapon. They may also be designed to allow for some shipments to be made under US control, to ensure continuing compliance with whatever understanding or agreement might be reached, avoiding if possible a complete breakdown in Cuban society and a consequent humanitarian crisis, or a direct conflict.

At press time it was unclear how third countries will react to the order which is extraterritorial in effect and runs counter to successive votes at the UN over many years in relation to the US embargo.

In a related development, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the USS Harry Truman, and an accompanying battle group have been undertaking live fire exercises 96 km north of eastern Cuba, and according to some reports other US naval vessels are present to Cuba’s south. Their location highlights Washington’s ability, if required, to interdict sanctioned shipments of oil while also posing the potential threat of military action.

Mexico halts oil supplies and seeks dialogue with US

Responding to President Trump’s decision to impose tariffs on countries that send oil to Cuba, Mexico’s President Claudia Sheinbaum, warned on 30 January that the measures could cause a humanitarian crisis in Cuba. Setting out Mexico’s response at her daily press conference she said that the US measure would affect the “hospitals, food and other basic services of the Cuban people, a situation that must be avoided through international law and dialogue between the parties.”

Continuing, she said “We need to know the scope because we also don’t want to put our country at risk in terms of tariffs,” while stressing the importance of resolution through diplomacy and non-confrontation. Sheinbaum noted that she had asked Mexico’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Juan Ramón de la Fuente, to make immediate contact with the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, to learn the exact nature of the new measure, and to inform him that “a humanitarian crisis must be prevented.” Mexico, Sheinbaum said, will seek alternative ways to help the Cuban people at “a difficult time.”

Two days before President Trump signed the Executive Order, Mexico’s President had repeated her earlier assertion that her government will make its own decisions regarding when and how it will continue to supply oil to Cuba.

Speaking on 27 January she told the media: “As we have said, it is a sovereign decision, and Pemex makes its own decisions …. when and how it is sent …. And it depends on what Pemex defines based on the contracts, or, in any case, on the government’s humanitarian decision to send it under certain circumstances.”

Her comments followed widely reported US pressure on the Mexican government and ongoing deliberations within her government about how to balance its relationship with the US and Cuba, in the light of the forthcoming review of the USMCA trade agreement with the US and Canada, and Mexico’s continuing exchanges with Washington on bilateral security issues relating to narcotics interdiction and migration.

Reuters reported that the issue of oil shipments to Cuba had become an internal debate within Sheinbaum’s government, with divisions emerging over whether to maintain, reduce, or suspend crude oil supplies out of concern about possible US retaliation, and those who see the supply of oil to Cuba as a moral obligation and an investment in regional stability. The news agency also reported that US Navy drones had been flown over routes similar to those followed by tankers transporting Mexican fuel across the Gulf of Mexico to Cuba.

Figures published in the Mexican media, shipping tracking data, and academic analysis suggests that Mexico became in 2025 the main supplier of oil and derivatives to Cuba. However, it is hard to know the true level of the previous oil supply from Venezuela as Venezuelan oil destined for China or elsewhere may have been partially transhipped at sea for delivery to Cuba, or alternatively sold on by Cuba to earn foreign exchange. It is also not known how much oil Cuba holds in its strategic reserve.

In early January, the oil tanker Ocean Mariner reportedly delivered about 86,000 barrels of fuel to Cuba from Mexico. Since then, there have been no further sailings. More generally, most analysts believe that Cuba needs around 110,000 barrels per day to cover its basic energy needs, of which about 40,000 come from domestic production.

Díaz-Canel tells Party members Cuba facing a multifaceted threat

Speaking on 30 January, President Díaz-Canel told an Extraordinary Plenary Session of the Provincial Council of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) in Havana that faced with US aggression “we have to be prepared, and we are preparing” for a multifaceted form of warfare.

In remarks to provincial council members reported in full in Cuba’s state media, he suggested that recent statements made by President Trump and Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, “reveal the intention to reinforce pressure and economic aggression against Cuba without ruling out military action.” Referring to the 32 Cubans who died fighting US forces in Venezuela, he said that Washington must calculate “what an attack on Cuba would cost it.” “Never,” the Cuban President asserted, “will surrender be an option, and hard times like these must be faced with courage and bravery,” he told the last of fifteen similar provincial meetings scheduled before the present crisis unfolded.

In this light, he said: “our Party, the State, the Government, the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the Ministry of the Interior and the united people are prepared to confront any additional blockade measures and any threat or military aggression with the same courage and determination as those Cubans who died in Venezuela.

Later, in conciliatory language, he said: “we have the capacity and the willingness to engage in dialogue with the United States government. The problem is that dialogue cannot take place under pressure. Dialogue must be conducted on equal terms, with respect, and without preconditions.“ He also noted that work will continue with friendly countries and the international community who support Cuba every year when the UN votes against the US embargo.

Trump Administration has a range of options

According to multiple reports, the Trump Administration has developed a suite of options beyond tariffs for the US President to consider. These include paralysing the Cuban economy through a naval blockade and attempting to identify a viable interlocutor in Cuba to negotiate change with.

The Wall Street Journal, Politico, and Reuters all citing unnamed sources in the US administration suggest that Washington has assessed that the Cuban economy is on the brink of total collapse and the country’s government is uniquely vulnerable following its loss of support from Venezuela.

The print and online publications variously quoted Administration sources as indicating that the US “does not yet have a detailed plan to overthrow the Cuban leadership”; the US military operation in Venezuela offers a potential model for action; the US administration “is seeking contacts within the Cuban government who could help organise a change of power on the island by the end of 2026”; “the country’s government has never been so vulnerable” as now; and the Cuban economy “is on the brink of total collapse.” Politico’s sources additionally suggested that any blockade could be justified under the 1994 US Helms-Burton Libertad legislation.

Referring to the US media reports on 24 January, Cuba’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Carlos Fernández de Cossío, described such media “leaks and speculation” as “a brutal assault against a peaceful nation that poses no threat to the US,” while noting that such measures are “irrefutable proof“ that the economic hardships faced by the Cuban people are primarily caused by Washington.

Uncertain times lie ahead for Cuba and Cubans

What is still unclear is who the US believes it might negotiate with or facilitate a transition in a country where all strategic decisions are collegiate, higher inter-related levels of the Cuban leadership remain cohesive, and matters of great national importance require the public endorsement of Cuba’s former President, Raul Castro.

It is also uncertain how without significant levels of internal Cuban administrative support, peaceful ‘regime change’ might be engineered by the US let alone subsequently managed. More than sixty years of Communist control has, irrespective of the hardships faced by many Cubans, ensured that almost every aspect of decision making in Cuba is delivered through its committed Communist Party leadership and cadres, with the involvement of a complex web of overlapping military, political, parliamentary, government, military and state enterprises, and civil organisations. There is also no organised opposition on the island, and Cuba’s history suggests that if required, significant numbers may for nationalistic or ideological reasons choose to fight or resist external pressure.

Despite this, and President Diaz Canel’s fiercely nationalistic remarks, he has continued to stress that his government is willing to engage in a dialogue with Washington if it is based on “equality” and “respect,” and that any understanding or negotiation does not involve coercion.

The nature of any dialogue between Cuban and US officials through back channels or the existing bilateral mechanism used annually to discuss migration and security issues remains unclear. In the past the Vatican and Norway have acted as interlocutors, and more recently Mexico has offered its services should both sides wish it. Cuba’s leadership is following closely the US approach to Venezuela and the ways in which Washington’s transactional dialogue with its acting President, Delcy Rodriguez, is moving forward with almost all of its leadership and its political institutions remaining intact.

National Defence Council says Cuba transitioning to ‘a state of war’

Cuba’s National Defence Council has met to review the island’s military preparedness in the event of a conflict with the US, according to a brief official statement published in Cuba’s state media on 17 January. The body is responsible for assuming control of the country in the event of a conflict. The statement indicated that the Council met to “analyse and approve the plans and measures for the transition to a state of war,” and that Raúl Castro “remained informed of the activity, which he described as good and efficient.” Cuba’s President leads National Defence Council meetings.

According to official reporting, the meeting focussed on increasing and improving preparedness and the “cohesion of the governing bodies and personnel relating to mobilisation in relation to Cuba’s strategic military doctrine of a “War of the Entire People.”.

Although no further details were provided, subsequent Cuban media coverage quoted President Díaz-Canel as saying on 24 January, National Defence Day, that the “best way to avoid aggression is for imperialism to have to calculate what the price of attacking our country would be. And that has a lot to do with our preparedness for this type of military action.”

Separately the Cuban News Agency (ACN) has highlighted actions being undertaken by the Provincial Defence Council for the province of Camagüey to ensure that in the event of a blockade or conflict the structure of its staffing, management and communications systems is complete. The report noted that “different subgroups were reviewed in a scenario of unconventional warfare and fighting against an enemy invasion.” Other issues considered according to ACN included “fire extinguishing and protection of workers against bombing” at various sites. In addition, “food preparation, and water supply to the population” was reviewed.

The detailed report also noted that a special training unit from the state telecoms company ETECSA demonstrated its ability to “guarantee communications and the protection of the media.” It indicated also that exercises relating to the concept of a war of all the people had involved Provincial, Municipal and Zone Defence Councils, practical exercises involving special forces, and the use of anti-aircraft defence systems, artillery, and drones.

Most analysts believe that the Cuban military would for ideological and nationalistic reasons fight or resist any US incursion. However, Cuban media coverage suggests that the island may not be fully prepared organisationally for a conflict and does not have the most modern weaponry and communications, indicating that any involvement by US forces would likely rapidly devolve to alternative and territorial forms of warfare. Conversely, if as appears likely, the US Administration does not for domestic political reasons wish to see US troops die in Cuba, Washington may choose to resort to targeted strikes.

Cuba has an established escalatory system of political and economic preparedness in relation to a range of external threats and scenarios. Between 1991 and 1995 Cuba experienced a period of extreme austerity during what was known as ‘The Special Period in Peacetime’ following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the sudden halt to the economic support it provided. Under Cuban law the declaration of a state of war is for the National Assembly or, if that is not possible the Council of State. The President and the National Defence Council focus on operational control, mobilisation and the response to any attack or incursion.

02 February 2026, Issue 1309

Díaz-Canel warns US that any understanding or dialogue cannot involve coercion

19 January 2026

19 January 2026

President Díaz-Canel has warned Washington in a fiercely nationalistic speech that it will not be possible to achieve any understanding or negotiation with Cuba based on “coercion.” He said, however, his government is willing to engage in a dialogue with the US if it is undertaken on the basis of “equality” and “respect.”

Addressing huge crowds gathered in Havana near the US Embassy on the second and final day of well-attended tributes to the 32 members of the Cuban military killed on 3 January when US forces seized the Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, and his wife Cilia Flores, he said: “There is no surrender or capitulation possible, nor any kind of understanding based on coercion or intimidation. Cuba does not have to make any political concessions, and that will never be on the table for negotiations for an understanding between Cuba and the United States.”

“This commitment to peace in no way diminishes our readiness to fight in defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Should we be attacked, we would fight with the same ferocity bequeathed to us by generations of brave Cuban combatants, from the wars for independence in the 19th century, through the Sierra Maestra, the underground resistance, and Africa in the 20th century, to Caracas in this 21st century. As has been the case for more than six decades, he observed, this will not change, and if required Cubans will fight with “unity and fierceness.”

Wearing the olive-green uniform of the head of Cuba’s National Defence Council, a legal requirement in wartime or general mobilisation, he said that Cubans are not at all afraid of the US and do not like being threatened or intimidated. We are, he said, “Like the rushes knotted in the centre of the shield, unity is the most powerful weapon of our Revolution.”

His comments however were tempered by realism about the domestic economic challenge now facing Cuba and the need to retain national unity. Observing that this had been present in all Cuban victories and that “every time the patriotic forces were divided, we lost,” but “every time they united, we triumphed,” Díaz-Canel stressed that “The enemies of the nation know this well, and that is why they are trying to break that unity.”

Cuban government and Cubans shocked by US intervention

President Díaz-Canel’s comments came at the end of two weeks that shocked the Cuban government and most Cubans, saw government, to some effect, invoke their sense of nationalism, identity, and history, and created global uncertainty about the Trump Administration’s future intentions towards the island. Just as significantly, the US intervention in Venezuela raised questions about the Cuban government’s ability to sustain its already weak economy and maintain social stability if it cannot find alternative sources of oil and the foreign exchange required to meet its daily requirements for power and fuel.

Although one day after the US intervention President Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One “We are talking with Cuba and you will know very soon” about US objectives in relation to the island, Trump later warned that Cuba will no longer receive more oil or money from Venezuela. Writing on his Truth Social network he suggested that the island has been “living for years” off Venezuelan money and crude oil in exchange for the “security services” provided for Presidents Hugo Chavez and Nicolás Maduro and this would not continue. Cuba, he said, should “reach an agreement before it’s too late.”

Speaking about Cuba in a Venezuela-related radio interview with Hugh Hewitt for the Salem News Channel and affiliates on 8 January, President Trump appeared to amplify this, suggesting that a US military intervention was unlikely, but he hoped for a transition through economic collapse. “I don’t think much more pressure can be exerted, short of going in and wrecking the place,” he said when asked if he would authorise a naval “quarantine” similar to that imposed on Venezuela. Questioned if he thought that President Díaz-Canel could “fall” he told Hewitt “Yes, Cuba is hanging by a thread. Cuba is in serious trouble.”

Responding to the US President’s assertion that Washington had been in an early dialogue with Havana, President Díaz-Canel refuted Trump’s suggestion. Cuba’s Foreign Minister, Bruno Rodríguez, also rejected his comments. Writing on X he said that the Cuban government “does not receive and has never received” monetary or material compensation for security services provided to any country.” Rodríguez also noted that Cuba “has the absolute right to import fuel from those markets willing to export it and that exercise their own right to develop their commercial relations without interference or subordination” from Washington’s “unilateral coercive measures.”

Díaz-Canel provides a first indication of government’s response

Speaking a few days later at a series of pre-planned plenary sessions of the provincial committees of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) held in Granma and Holguín, but later in every province, President Díaz-Canel, provided a first indication of how Cuba intends to respond.

“In the face of the empire’s threats, Cuba will continue to consolidate its preparedness for defence and its work in the economic and social sphere.” “This is a historic stage,” he said, “where we have to reach a higher level in the functioning of the Party, the State, the Government, our institutions, the youth, the mass organisations, the administrations, business activity, and by appealing to all the alternatives we have to continue moving forward.”

Stressing the need for Cuban preparedness and defence readiness, he particularly emphasised the need to restore rapidly economic growth and earn foreign exchange. Priority, he said, will be given to the “effective implementation of the Government’s economic reform programme aimed at revitalising the economy.” We are on a productive offensive to bring in more foreign currency, to export more, to produce more nationally, because this situation, is reaffirming what we have to do,” he told the Communist Party meetings.

Cuba facing an uncertain future without rapid economic change

In the two days that followed the repatriation of the remains of the Cubans who died fighting US forces in Venezuela, large numbers of Cubans queued in Havana to mourn and pay tribute and attend the marches and rallies that took place there and in many other cities.

Although many of the details about the US military operation ‘Absolute Resolution’ are still emerging, the US intervention to remove President Maduro and his wife resulted in the deaths of 32 Cubans guarding the Venezuelan President and of senior intelligence and liaison officers at other locations attacked by the US. Some of the Cubans injured in the reportedly fierce fighting that took place subsequently returned to Cuba to be welcomed home at Havana’s Jose Marti Airport as heroes by the Cuban President and all leading members of the Cuban Communist Party, the military, and Government.

However, less certain is the extent to which many citizens and especially the young’s views coincide with those of the large numbers of Cubans who serve in, or remain committed to the military and Communist Party or who would be prepared to fight for their country under Cuba’s military defence doctrine of a war of all the people.

Sadness, patriotism, and supressed anxiety

Ten days after the US intervention in Venezuela it is hard to determine broader public reaction beyond an immediate sense of sadness, patriotism, and supressed anxiety, as many ordinary Cubans now fear that recent developments could lead to a direct conflict with the US, or a further deterioration in their already diminished living standards. It is equally difficult to see how Cuba can create the rapid economic growth now needed or, despite President Díaz-Canel’s comments, accelerate the delivery of the relatively limited macro-economic reforms that government first enunciated in late 2023.

It is also unclear the extent to which exhortation will work in a country where much needed economic reform that benefits ordinary Cubans continues to be held back by the over-regulation of the islands embryonic private sector, and bureaucracy, poor management, and failing agriculture, confound the progress sought by the island’s more liberal academic economists seeking a market oriented socialist economy.

The Cuban government also has yet to explain how a country already struggling with daily blackouts and shortages will be able to to replace and finance at world market prices its once important but now severely diminished subsidised source of energy supply from Venezuela.

19 January 2026, Issue 1308

Image Reference: https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article314183625.html

Cuba’s leader Miguel Díaz-Canel during a rally in support of Nicolás Maduro, on January 3, 2025, following news of his extraction by U.S. forces to face charges of narco-terrorism in the United States. Office of The Cuban President.

Central Bank introduces managed floating foreign exchange rate

5 January 2026

05 January 2026

Cuba’s Central Bank (BCC) has announced a new floating exchange rate, modified daily, based on supply and demand. The measure announced on 18 December is principally intended to enable private and state-owned exporting companies and certain other entities to buy foreign currency at “competitive prices.”

The decision has the effect of dividing the official exchange market into three regulated segments: the first two being the existing fixed rate of US$1 to CUP24, the second the Cadeca rate of US$1 to CUP120, and a new third floating rate which was launched at US$1 to CUP410. It is hoped that the new mechanism will lead eventually to the full convertibility of the Cuban peso (CUP).

Granma noted that the floating rate is being introduced at a time that is not ideal for the economy, and that “the full satisfaction of potential demand cannot be expected.” The express intention is, however, “to reach a rate that truly reflects the real conditions of the economy” and that “initially the rate must remain close to the one currently prevailing in the informal market.”

The much-delayed announcement of what is in effect a significant devaluation in the official rate of the Cuban Peso to the US Dollar, means that the BCC, according to the Communist Party’s official publication, will now “administratively mediate” the foreign exchange market. This, in effect, it reported will see the Bank intervene when necessary, acting “as just another competitor” in the market for the Dollar, Euro, and other convertible currencies.

This new approach will see the floating rate published daily by the BCC in its role as the country’s monetary authority. Apart from being available to non-state forms of management, forex through the new floating exchange rate will be accessible, and its use permitted under specific conditions to individuals, legal exporting entities, and those able to generate foreign currency for the country through their bank accounts.

After the announcement by the BCC, Pedro Carbonell, the Director of Macroeconomic Policy at the Central Bank, told Granma in an interview that the availability of foreign exchange in this way is intended to remove “any element of manipulation and speculation,” and provide an “attractive rate.”

He noted, however, the availability of foreign currency to purchase at the floating rate will depend on the availability at the bank, “which, as a rule, will only sell what it collects from purchases.” He said that in the initial stage, the limit of up to US$100 per bank transaction will remain in place, using the same mechanisms as at present, but as the market consolidates and new bank branches are opened across the country offering a cash purchase and sale service based on the floating rate, “the market itself will determine the relaxation of these controls.”

Carbonell also noted that the foreign currency purchasing power of non-state management entities will be limited to 50% of the average gross income as reflected in their tax accounts for the previous quarter.

Currency unification still some way off

The Cuban government and the BCC statements made clear that the eventual objective of unifying Cuba’s ever more complex highly regulated foreign exchange system is still some way off.

Overall currency unification, according to the BCC “can only be achieved gradually, through successive approximations” as a “sharp devaluation of the peso would have greater inflationary effects than those currently being experienced.” The present step “enables a better connection between the domestic and global economy; is intended principally to boost export activity; and for the entities involved to experience better financial conditions, “make investments, cover expenses in Cuban Pesos, and increase salaries,” Granma reported.

The guiding principle, the BCC said, will be “gradualism and temporality.” Movement towards exchange rate and monetary convergence it noted, will be based on macroeconomic stability, the operational capacity of the banking system, and a regulatory framework adjusted to current conditions.

To protect the population no sharp devaluation envisaged

Speaking on Canal Caribe, the Minister President of the Central Bank, Juana Lilia Delgado, said that the first two market segments of Cuba’s foreign exchange system will be maintained in such a way that there are no sharp devaluations of exchange rates. This she stressed is essential “to ensure the value of the national currency and the population is protected in basic and sensitive areas enabling stability and predictability in the price of essential goods and services.”

The third and new segment, she said, is intended to “incentivise the inflow of foreign currency into the exchange market, providing a source of funds for their operations …. reducing pressures and irregularities in the informal market.” As such, she told viewers, it forms a part of “a set of financial, commercial, tax and other measures, that aim to improve the efficiency of the economy.”

Other measures being implemented include:

The stabilisation and progressive strengthening of freely convertible currency accounts (MLC) with the objective of strengthening the digital currency’s purchasing power and value in use. It is hoped that the new mechanism for managing, controlling, and allocating foreign currency will enable the MLC’s functionality to be recovered.

The guaranteed operability of non-state management forms’ bank accounts, “allowing them to execute foreign currency transactions both internally and in foreign trade operations.”

Legal access to foreign currency previously unavailable through the exchange market for non-state forms of management for investments or restocking via requests to their commercial bank and through the bank accounts that the new mechanism will allow them to create.

Agreement on the direct purchase and sale of foreign currency if non-state forms of management can establish links with any other entity, such as suppliers of goods or services with available foreign currency

The daily publication by the Central Bank of the exchange rates.

The sale by Cubans of their Dollars, Euros and other currencies at banks and Cadeca at an “attractive” rate, without resorting to the informal market.

The initial official floating rate was set at levels almost identical to those published by the independent media outlet El Toque. On the same day as the official announcement, it was reported that El Toque’s website was unavailable on the island following a cyberattack. Earlier the Cuban government and media had alleged the platform was involved in politically inspired currency manipulation through its daily publication of informal street rates for the exchange of the Cuban Peso. (Background 15 December 2025).

New approach adds to complexity, economic uncertainty

The decision by the BCC and Government to take a gradualist, complex, and highly regulated approach to reform of the foreign exchange market rather than undertake overall unification and the huge devaluation this would imply, reflects a fear that any ‘once and for all’ approach at this time would damage further the already weak national cohesion and fuel the potential for social volatility and possible public protest.

In addition to the three official rates now in operation, the hoped for restoration in value of the MLC, the continuing existence of a variable street rate, the more general creeping dollarisation of the economy, and recent external developments, make less clear how long the gradual approach being taken will remain viable, or how and when the ultimate unification process might be sequenced or achieved. In short, much has yet to be explained. Although the likely outcome of Cuba’s latest attempt to bring order to its foreign exchange market, stimulate foreign exchange retention, and encourage exports and economic growth, could prove effective in the short term, it is unlikely to remove from investors and traders minds, doubts about Cuba’s future economic trajectory.

On 18 December, the official floating rate was launched at CUP410 to US$1, and CUP481.42 to €1. As at 2 January 2026 the rates stood at CUP466 to US$1 and CUP396 to €1.

Alonso warns economic outlook for 2026 may worsen as tensions increase

Cuba’s Minister of the Economy and Planning, Joaquín Alonso, has forecast that Cuba will experience 1% growth in 2026, a rate originally projected but not met in 2025. Cuba’s President has said separately that in the first three quarters of 2025 the economy contracted by more than 4%.

Addressing a shortened meeting of Cuba’s National Assembly held before Christmas, Alonso said that the “complex” economic scenario experienced in 2025 will persist, that tensions may worsen, and the “wartime economy” that the island is experiencing will continue to be subject to threats and risks.

The slight improvement is based, the minister said, on an expected improvement in visitor arrivals and the sales of medical and other international services abroad. Regarding inflation, he forecast that it is expected to result in a 10% increase in prices in the formal market, a figure lower than in 2025, but significantly less than the double-digit figure analysts say, prevails in the informal market.

Speaking days earlier at the also truncated eleventh plenum of the Cuban Communist Party, Alonso said that the Economic Plan for 2026 recognises the tensions that Cuba is experiencing and the need to mobilise all existing reserves to incorporate the challenges. He warned, however, that it had not been possible to project higher expenses than the income generated, and that “adjustment options” had been introduced to “reduce the deficit to a manageable level” against the background of a “war economy scenario” influenced by combined and accumulated internal and external factors, including the intensified US sanctions now affecting “all spheres of the Cuban economy and society.”

Cuba’s pragmatic economy minister told Central Committee members that in 2025 the limited financial resources available had been concentrated on meeting priority payments, including those for food, fuel, the maintenance, recovery, and development of the National Electric Power System, medicines, and on national defence and security. Despite this, he said, at an operational level management of the economy continued to be extremely complex, as “the resources have proven insufficient.”

Speaking about 2026, Alonso told Cuba’s second highest political decision making body that it will be a year in which this complex scenario will persist, with “threats, tensions and risks that we must be able to overcome, with our own efforts, with the resources available at each moment, with the reserves that we must mobilise and the opportunities that are also envisioned and managed.” The MEP minister also stressed in this regard that “it is not possible to project more expenses than the expected income” and that in calculating the budget for 2026 it was necessary to make “adjustments” to “key variables” to achieve a “manageable deficit”.

In his presentation, Alonso indicated that the total exports of goods and services projected for 2026 amount to US$9.969bn, exceeding the estimate for the current year by US$1.122bn based on goods exports of US$2.53bn and services exports of US$7.438bn. Speaking about imports, the minister said without providing further details, would be “concentrated on fuels and food,” with food imports exceeding 2025’s estimate by US$288mn.

05 January 2026, Issue 1307

New forex controls on Cuba-based business likely to reinforce dollarisation

15 December 2025

15 December 2025

Cuba’s Council of State has approved a Decree Law and several resolutions that establish a new “transitional” mechanism for the management, control, and allocation of foreign currency.

The measures seek to boost exports and productive enterprises, but are also likely also to reinforce the dollarisation of the Cuban economy.

The new regulations do not establish a new floating exchange rate, or seek to unify Cuba’s multiple official and unofficial exchange rates as originally envisaged when the country’s macro-economic reform process was first announced in December 2023.

Instead, the new law will allow the Minister of Economy and Planning and the President of the Central Bank to exercise greater control over foreign exchange availability; establish the requirements and procedures relating to foreign currency transactions in the national economy; and update the legal basis for foreign exchange transactions. The measures are intended, officials say, to “mark the first step towards changes to the country’s foreign exchange regime.”

The text of the documents makes clear that the overriding objective is to increase the country’s foreign exchange income by stimulating national production of goods and services. Although the Council of State indicated that the measures are meant only to continue “until economic conditions allow” and a Cuban Peso “controlled by State institutions” returns to being the only legal tender in the country”, the new arrangements have the effect of formalising the growing dollarisation of many aspects of the Cuban economy.

Central Bank President outlines the monetary objectives

The background and intention of the limited changes were explained by the Minister of Economy and Planning (MEP), Joaquín Alonso, and the President of the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC), Juana Lilia Delgado, who were interviewed for the television and radio programme Mesa Redonda just after the measures were published.

Delgado said that the new law and regulations update previous, by allowing currencies other than the Cuban Peso (CUP) to be legal tender for economic transactions alongside the CUP for foreign exchange payments and transactions between Cuba-based economic actors. This will enable, she stated, Cuban, foreign, and mixed legal entities, as well as individuals engaged in productive activities or any type of economic transaction, to denominate a payment instrument in foreign currency. The changes also apply to international economic partnership agreements, local development projects, international cooperation projects, and international organisations, Delgado noted.

Such foreign currency transactions, she said, will be authorised by the Ministry of Economy and Planning (MEP) through new procedures that will prioritise export activities, production linked to the export sector, import substitution, and other operations that contribute to increasing foreign currency income.

The measure, she noted, will enable the BCC and MEP to regulate “which parts of the economy will operate using foreign currency transactions,” how each entity participates, and “how they will benefit.”

Alonso outlines operational aspects of the new policy

Providing more detail, the MEP Minister, Joaquín Alonso, said that the new measure will regulate foreign exchange transactions based on existing foreign exchange accounts, or through foreign exchange access capacity allocations. In doing so, he made clear that the regulation determines how foreign exchange is allocated by the State to beneficiaries, how to access it, how to request it, and the validity period of the allocation. The new law, he said, also specifies which transactions within the economy will operate in foreign currency, and will “define what constitutes legal access to foreign currency.”

Speaking about the latter aspect, Alonso said that the intention is to encourage “something that is closely linked to mechanisms for buying and selling foreign currency in a foreign exchange market that is also undergoing transformation.” In doing so, he noted that other activities that generate foreign currency income will be encouraged, including the establishment of e-commerce mechanisms taking payments from abroad.

Speaking about the retention of foreign currency earned, the Minister said that authorised entities will be able to retain a significant portion of the currency generated, ensuring their liquidity, and will be able to freely dispose of it, especially to develop their core business or activities that allow them to increase their income.

On the subject of economic actors such as state enterprises that do not generate foreign currency but require foreign exchange for priority activities, Alonso said that a second regulation allows the MEP to authorise specific amounts to beneficiaries to purchase foreign currency from the Central Exchange using Cuban Pesos at “the official exchange rate in effect.” This will allow the replacement of what were previously called liquidity capacity accounts on the basis that the authorisation to access foreign currencies is “not a means of payment.”

Exchange rate decision someway off, dollarisation said to be transitional

Alonso also made clear that government is working towards determining the rate of exchange for the Cuban Peso. ”As the Prime Minister has explained at other events, we are working on a restructuring of the foreign exchange market that takes into account all the peculiarities, problems, and distortions of the economy, as part of the Government Programme,” he said, without providing any further detail.

In other remarks, the Economy minister was quoted as saying, “We are not building capitalism with the partial dollarisation of the economy; we are building socialism with the characteristics of our country.”

For her part, Delgado was quoted as saying that the new measures are temporary, and that the transitional framework was created in response to the partial dollarisation of some sectors. “A time limit is set because we have not given up on the goal of recovering a monetary environment where the Cuban Peso is the centre of the monetary and financial system,” she said.

According to Cubadebate, the new measures are intended to contribute “to establishing the necessary macroeconomic and financial conditions to gradually shift foreign exchange transactions towards the restoration of the role of the Cuban Peso and its convertibility in a new, transformed exchange market, based on measures that must be implemented in parallel” with the provisions of the new Decree Law.

More detail available online

More detail on the operation of the new system can be found in Spanish in Cubadebate’s detailed question and answer session with the Minister of Economy and Planning and the President of the Central Bank.

The issues the two address in the interview include: the scope of the legislation; foreign exchange retention in relation to joint ventures, economic association contracts, and companies in the Mariel Special Development Zone (ZEDM); the effect on international cooperation projects; the procedures for Cuban state-owned enterprises; the use of the Central Fund retention scheme by government to take 20% of foreign currency earnings from exports or productive chains to support Cuba’s social commitments; and when 100% of foreign exchange income can be retained by any economic actor. The lengthy article also outlines how the system will operate, and contains detail as to when and how payments can be made in allocated foreign currencies.

The extended interview in Cubadebate can be found in Spanish at: http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2025/12/11/cuba-implementara-un-nuevo-sistema-de-gestion-control-y-asignacion-de-divisas/

The full text of Decree law 113 and Resolutions 140 (General bases for the system of management, control and allocation of foreign currency in the national economy ), 125 (Rules for the operation of bank accounts denominated in foreign currency ) and 126 ( Rules for the allocation of access capacity to foreign currency ) can be found on the website of the Ministry of the Economy and Planning in Spanish at https://www.mep.gob.cu/sites/default/files/Documentos/Marco%20Regulatorio/goc-2025-o89.pdf

15 December 2025, Issue 1306

Minister outlines new approach to foreign investment

1 December 2025

01 December 2025

Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment has said that Cuba will introduce shortly a series of measures designed to revitalise foreign investment in Cuba.

Speaking at the opening of the Eighth Investment Forum held during the Havana International Fair (FIHAV 2025), Deputy Prime Minister Oscar Pérez-Oliva, outlined what he described as a new and innovative approach linked to government’s recently updated macro-economic reform programme (See Cuba Briefings 17 and 24 November 2025).

Pérez-Oliva, who was recently promoted and has since taken a much higher public profile nationally, outlined in his remarks changes that are expected to be implemented shortly through new regulations.

The new approach, the Minister told existing and potential investors, will see a differentiated framework for foreign investors, enabling them to operate, according to need, in both local and foreign currency. The planned measures are to be linked to the partial dollarisation of the economy and the need for foreign investments to be focussed on obtaining external sources of income, either through exports or by being aligned to segments of the domestic market that generate foreign currency.

In his remarks Pérez-Oliva said that a further modification under consideration is a change in the way businesses involving foreign capital are treated in the country’s economic planning. From now on, he said, only dividends from the Cuban side and foreign currency earnings from related Cuban entities will be considered when discussing new foreign investments, enabling greater flexibility compared to previous approaches.

The idea now, the Minister said, is to extend Cuba’s experience of mixed-capital companies that “have achieved the best results in history” so that enterprises operate with greater dynamism, confidence, and financial autonomy.

In addition, he noted, existing legislation will be activated to enable companies wishing to establish bank accounts abroad, to do so. This is now seen, he said, as a tool that can complement their operations and make their sources of foreign currency income more flexible, helping them to cope with the effects of the US embargo.

In his remarks the Deputy Prime Minister confirmed that, as part of the process of partial dollarisation, foreign currency pricing will be established in some sectors for goods and services. These tariffs, he stated, will be more competitive and more realistic than current exchange market options.

Potentially far-reaching changes on underutilised national assets

In his address Pérez-Oliva announced that government is to make underutilised national assets and production facilities available to foreign investors. This would enable them, he said, to invest, operate, and profit, with the possibility that after an agreed-upon period the facility will revert to the State. The objective, he said, is to allow “foreign investors to participate more actively in the reactivation of productive activity in our country.” If the idea is commercially viable, the potentially far-reaching decision is expected to be of interest to foreign investors in Russia, China and elsewhere who have expressed an interest in involvement in failing sectors of the Cuban economy including sugar, power generation, and the railways.

The deputy prime minister also revealed that government will promote foreign investment in the banking and financial sector and that a previous decision to create “special development zones” remains in place. Such zones, he said, while not necessarily as extensive as the Mariel Special Economic Development Zone (ZEDM), could be smaller and dedicated to specific activities such as real estate or technology parks, and have more flexible special regulations to stimulate their development.

In relation to the tourism sector, Pérez-Oliva confirmed that foreign investors leasing operational hotel facilities will “automatically be established as a foreign investor under the category of a wholly foreign-owned enterprise,” will benefit from Cuba’s Foreign Investment Law, and have the right to engage in foreign trade. The objective, he said, is that, once the contract is awarded, “the company can begin managing the facility within 60 days, avoiding slower, traditional procedures.”

Turning to the concerns of potential investors relating to the employment of the Cuban workforce, the Minister said that the focus will be on providing greater flexibility. Although “the (Cuban) employer is expected to participate in the selection process …. the final hiring decision will be made by the investor, either directly or through the employer,” he told the Forum.” Pérez-Oliva additionally noted that it will in future be possible to pay bonuses in foreign currency, charged against profits, through bank transfers provided the company generates external income.

Regarding operational matters, the Deputy Prime Minister of MINCEX stated that in future “any type of foreign investment can wholesale its products and services to any domestic economic actor with the capacity to pay.” “There are no restrictions of any kind… there are no obstacles, nothing prohibiting it,” he emphasised.

In addition, he stated, foreign investments will have direct and unrestricted access to purchasing fuel in foreign currency, and in cases of unavailability, “investors will be permitted to directly import the fuel they require.”

Approval process for foreign investment to be simplified

Turning to the process of approving foreign investments, Pérez-Oliva said that the Cuban government remained committed to implementing “simpler, more agile and more transparent processes for foreign investors.” As a part of this new approach, he announced:

The previous requirement that investors submit a feasibility study for the approval of a new business, will be replaced by the submission of a business plan. The new requirement will require a projection of the investor’s expectations for their proposal.

“Before starting any business relationship an objective analysis will be undertaken to ensure that the proposal corresponds to the country’s development goals.

A more flexible approach will be applied to incorporation documents. While the requirement for incorporation documents and commercial certification for foreign companies will remain, specific additional documents will only be requested when the business model requires it for technical reasons.

The validity of appraisals of state assets (such as land or infrastructure) will be extended to more than one year to speed up processes that were previously delayed by the expiration of such valuations.

The institutional evaluation process will be speeded up with the Evaluation Commission reducing its timeframe for completing a process from 15 to 7 days. Additionally, the principle of “positive silence” will be applied, meaning “that if a state agency does not respond within the established timeframe, it will be assumed to agree with the proposal.”

New regulations expected early next year

Subsequently, Cuba’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment, Yanet Vazquez, confirmed that some of the measures announced will entail modifications to current legislation, and a new decree law will be issued and a MINCEX joint resolution updated. Confirming to the media that work is underway on this and while other aspects of what was announced will be implemented using current regulations, she said that “more structural and profound changes will be enshrined in a new Foreign Investment Law. This is expected to be presented to the National Assembly when it meets in December

According to Cuban officials, the island currently has 376 businesses with foreign capital from 40 countries, 56 of which are located in the ZEDM. In 2025, 32 new investments from 13 countries were approved involving US$1.1 bn in committed capital, of which 10 were approved through new, simpler, and more streamlined procedures, managed directly by heads of state agencies.

01 December 2025, Issue 1304

Photo Source:

https://cubasi.cu/en/news/41st-havana-international-fair-inaugurated-today

Díaz-Canel seeks unity on revised macro-economic reforms

25 November 2025

25 November 2025

President Díaz-Canel, speaking as President of the National Defense Council, has told Cuba’s Council of State that the coming process of studying and analysing the Government’s recently revised and published programme of macro-economic reform must be “a participatory and constructive exercise.”

It must also, he said, be a “collective construction that the population understands and contributes to,” delivering “concrete proposals derived from the debates.”

The conclusions, he stressed, must be able to be “defended in every economic, political and social scenario, the implementation of which, with the contribution of all, transforms the situation of the country.”

His comments published in Granma, were followed by an announcement by Cuba’s Communist Party that a detailed nationwide study and analysis of the programme will review and submit proposals “aimed at strengthening the Programme and identifying, in each specific context, how to contribute to its implementation.” This it said will involve all Communist Party associated bodies, mass organisations, municipal assemblies, and all national, provincial, and municipal governing councils.

The analysis which began on 15 November and will run to 30 December, is described as an important step towards the Communist Party’s 9th Party Congress to be held on 16-19 April 2026, and as enabling all political entities, militants and citizens “to contribute to the search for solutions in order to reverse the situation in the country.”

The new process follows a growing national sense of unease about the likely impact of the revised reform programme, its objectives, and differences within Cuba’s socialist system as to the viability and impact of the remedies proposed. This is because most Cubans, including the most vulnerable, are already having to cope with shortages of food, basic goods and medicines, price inflation, constant interruptions to the power and water supply, creeping dollarisation, all at a time of continuing low wages.

In its report, the official publication indicated that at its most recent regular session, the Council of State had reviewed the progress being made on the process of economic reform and the work that still remains in relation to “improving government management, national defence and security,” and “ensuring protection for vulnerable individuals, families, households, and communities.”

Party official says process of change “won’t be resolved in a single year”

As the review began, Cubadebate published a lengthy interview with Jorge Luis Broche, the Head of the Economic and Productive Department and a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), on “the political vision” that he said underpins its strategy for the gradual recovery of the economy.

His answers, deeply imbued with the language, analysis and thinking of the PCC’s leading political role and historic experience, makes clear that there will be no freeing of the economy or private sector, that the new process is based on multiple “guiding documents” from the Communist Party’s first congress in 1975 to the present day, and that its will play a continuing role in almost all future aspects of economic development.

Speaking about the latest iteration of Cuba’s economic reform programme (Details Cuba Briefing 17 November 2025), Broche made clear that the process of change “won’t be resolved in a single year” in relation to the macro-economic imbalance, restoring the electricity supply, increasing external revenues, or controlling the relationship between the state and non-state sectors. Rather, he said, that the revised programme’s general objectives now contain actions that must be addressed within a year, “hence the annual nature of the Programme.”

To achieve delivery, Broche told Cubadebate, there will be ongoing monitoring by government and the State at all levels using new software. This he said will be integrated into the Communist Party’s work systems from the municipal to the national level, involve “process oversight,” regular guidance by cadres, and communicating knowledge of the programme to the Cuban people. “We have the design in the architecture of the Cuban political system that will allow us to control the processes that derive from the implementation of the Government Programme, from the Party, the State and the Government,” he told the online media platform .

Primacy of efficient and profitable state enterprise emphasised

Regarding re-sizing state-owned enterprises, Broche noted that given it is not possible to relinquish the fundamental role of such entities, the programme must prioritize business efficiency in their management, modify their energy matrix, and connect them with other economic actors through joint projects. In all these respects, he told the media platform, the stste companies that are already achieving this are technology-based, put knowledge to work for development, and export not only goods and services but also intangibles. Such successful actors, he said, demonstrate “the plan we have works,” and “the challenge is for the majority to follow this path.”

Broche made clear, however, that engagement with the non-state sector of the economy “presents a significant challenge,” as, he said, most such entities are not unionised within the Cuban system. To address this, he suggested that it will be necessary to “bring them together in common spaces, share the Programme with them, and, above all, ensure they meet their respective objectives.”

More generally, Broche’s extended answers in the interview point to the PCC having decided that what is needed to deliver the programme is greater oversight and control, the creation of new monitoring mechanisms, and a constant debate involving multiple institutions and mass organisations in the period leading up to the Party Congress next April.

Next year’s Communist Party Congress to be able to modify the new plan

The interview concluded with Broche confirming, in answer to a question about whether the Ninth Party Congress will have the capacity to substantially modify the published revised document, that the collective debate now underway will form a part of the documents presented at the Party Congress.

Quoting Cuba’s President, the senior Communist Party official, noted that it is essential that the process of discussion “contributes significantly to unity,” and finding a consensus on economic issues, which are “crucial for the present and future of the Revolution.”

That is why, Broche said, the President he has demanded that this process be “properly secured and consolidated.” “Since these are economic issues, it’s not a linear equation with a single solution. There are different paths to reach that position,“ Broche noted. “When we reach a consensus, that’s the consensus. Which doesn’t mean we all agree, but it is the consensus. And that’s the path we all have to take to reach that desired outcome,” he told Cubadebate.

25 November 2025, Issue 1303

Cuba Briefing
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