Cuba Briefing
The Caribbean Council's Exclusive Publication on Cuba

The Cuba Briefing is your news and insight resource for the latest developments in Cuba.

Published since the mid-1990s, Cuba Briefing is an unparalleled resource of detailed analysis on economic, social and political developments going on inside Cuba including analysis on the Cuban government’s priorities and policy developments towards foreign investors, economic reform, and the growth of the private sector.

Cuba Briefing is produced on a weekly basis by David Jessop, the director and founder of the Cuba Initiative and Non-Executive Director of the Caribbean Council, providing expert insight and a longer term lens on week-to-week developments in the country.

Don’t miss out on the latest news business and opportunities from the region. Subscribe to receive the Cuba Briefing Publication directly to your inbox. Subscribers receive 45 editions over 12 months. Click to Subscribe.

Leading Articles Featured in Cuba Briefing

China’s President confirms willingness to provide greater support to Cuba

08 September 2025

President Xi Jinping has told President Díaz-Canel that China “is willing to continue providing assistance and support to Cuba to the extent of its possibilities.”

His remarks follow from an important bilateral meeting that took place in Moscow in May when both leaders attended Russia’s celebration of its World War II victory over fascism. At the time, China’s President noted that relations with Cuba were at “a new stage featuring deeper political mutual trust, closer strategic coordination and more solid popular support.” (Cuba Briefing 12 May 2025).

Subsequently in late June, the Chinese government’s Special Representative for Latin American Affairs, Qiu Xiaoqi, paid an unusually long ten-day visit to Cuba involving high-level meetings, “in-depth” exchanges, and a country-wide tour focussed on practical cooperation.

Following the visit, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) said in a statement that “China is willing to follow through on the important common understandings reached between the two heads of state, enhance bilateral exchanges, deepen practical cooperation, and continuously build a China-Cuba community with a shared future.”

China’s MFA also recognised “Cuba’s willingness to develop business cooperation projects that will bring mutual benefits,” before describing relations as strategic and special, and as serving as an example among socialist countries. It also noted that relations between the two Communist parties and countries had “shown fresh vibrancy” (Cuba Briefing 30 June 2025).

At the time the Cuban Presidency website quoted President Díaz-Canel as saying ties between the two countries were entering a new, “more solid,” phase, confirming “the political will to advance relations and find joint solutions at the highest level.” It had been agreed in Moscow, Cuban reporting noted, that “bi-national cooperation” would be expanded and strengthened in areas including biotechnology, tourism, and infrastructure development.

Xi’s confirmation of renewed Chinese support came on the same day that Cuba’s President participated with other world leaders – including Russia’s President Putin and North Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong-un – in events to mark the 80th anniversary of China’s victory over Japan and the end of the second world war.

Díaz-Canel promises a more favourable business environment

Xinhua, China’s official news agency, quoted China’s President as telling Díaz-Canel in Beijing that the two sides should now seize the opportunity and mark the 65th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations “to elevate bilateral ties to a higher level.” Xi also said that both Cuba and China should continue to mutually assist one another “and systematically promote development cooperation.” In doing so, he urged the implementation by both sides of China’s Global Security Initiative, Global Civilisation Initiative, and Global Governance Initiative. China will, he said, “continue to firmly support Cuba’s just struggle against interference and the blockade.”

According to Xinhua, in his response, Diaz-Canel emphasised that Cuba looks forward to “further strengthening all-round cooperation and high-quality Belt and Road co-operation and stands ready to provide a more favourable business environment for Chinese enterprises.” It also noted that a joint statement on accelerating the building of the China-Cuba community with a shared future was issued and multiple bilateral cooperation documents were signed.

Official Cuban reporting quoted President Díaz-Canel as thanking President Xi “for his deep personal involvement and sensitivity in issues related to Cuba and for leading the exceptional support that the Asian nation is providing to the island.”

He also told China’s President that relations are “indestructible,” and that Cuba was “honoured to be the first country in Latin America and the Caribbean to build a Community of Shared Future” with China.” Prior to departing from Havana Díaz-Canel had written on X that Cuba supports China’s Global Governance Initiative as it “will contribute to the reform of the global governance system and ensure the construction of a Community of a Shared Future.”

China’s concept of a ‘shared future’ envisions a world where countries with different systems, ideologies, and levels of development come together to pursue common interests, uphold shared rights, and fulfil common responsibilities.

Cuban reporting additionally quoted President Xi as having told Díaz-Canel, “you convened an event for this important anniversary in Havana, and you personally led it, which fully demonstrates the special friendship between China and Cuba, for which I express my high appreciation.” He also asked Díaz-Canel to convey his greetings to “comrade Raúl Castro.”

Later in a speech to mark the 65th anniversary of bilateral relations, the Chinese Vice President, Han Zheng, noted that the meeting between President Xi Jinping and his Cuban counterpart had allowed them “to reach a new consensus to continue consolidating the close relationship between the Chinese and Cuban parties, governments, and peoples.” Responding Díaz-Canel said that the meeting had enabled them “to renew concepts about what cooperation between China and Cuba should look like in the key areas that involve the economic and social development of our country.” “We have found,” he said, “cooperation models of common interest that guarantee mutual benefit and allow for integration among those participating in these projects.” See also China section below.

The Cuban Presidency website indicated that in Beijing eleven cooperation documents were signed. Among them were agreements related to the Belt and Road Initiative, political consultations, practical cooperation, cultural exchanges, and China’s Global Security Initiative. Commitments were also made on agricultural cooperation, territorial cooperation, artificial intelligence, traditional medicine, quality infrastructure, and on press, film, and television. No further details were provided.

In Beijing, Díaz-Canel met with Li Xi, the Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, who previously visited Cuba and recently discussed party organisation and discipline with Cuba’s Foreign Minister, and with Han Zheng, China’s Vice President, among others. The Cuban delegation in Beijing included the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Investment, Energy and Mines, Communications, the President of the Central Bank, and the President of BioCubaFarma.

China is presently involved in the construction of seven solar parks in six Cuban provinces, has over ten joint projects with Cuba mainly in high-tech areas such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, neuroscience, and nanotechnology, has several joint research institutes located in China in these and other areas, is donating transport equipment and rice, and is cooperating in higher education and on various joint research programmes. It also maintains a close working relationship with Cuba’s armed forces and Cuba’s interior ministry.

Cuba promises Vietnam to eliminate investment and trade bureaucracy

Cuba’s President travelled to Beijing from Vietnam. There he participated in events marking the 80th anniversary of the proclamation of Vietnamese independence on the first leg of a tour that also took in Laos.

In Hanoi at the end of meetings with senior figures from the Vietnamese Communist Party, government and business leaders, both sides signed a lengthy joint communique that included language relating to previously expressed Vietnamese concerns about Cuban bureaucracy and the slow pace at which projects the country is committed to in Cuba are moving forward (Cuba Briefing 28 July 2025).

In a section dealing with both nations desire “to promote and deepen bilateral economic, trade, and investment cooperation,” especially in strategic and potentially new areas, the communique notes that those involved in the high level meetings “called on the relevant authorities in both countries to increase exchanges and coordination to eliminate difficulties and obstacles, and to make full use of the Vietnam-Cuba Trade Agreement to increase and diversify trade volumes.” The document also noted that “the Cuban side reiterated its support and encouragement of the presence and participation of Vietnamese companies and projects in Cuba’s economic and social development process and assured that it will continue to create favourable conditions for this purpose.”

To accelerate cooperation both sides also agreed to a coordinated “review and evaluation of the effectiveness of cooperation mechanisms and agreements” and to assign to specific ministries the development of new methods and forms of cooperation …. appropriate to each country.” Details of some of the sectors the two nations have agreed to focus on will appear in the next issue.

Highlights in this issue:

  • US Justice Department backs Exxon in its Helms Burton lawsuit against CIMEX and CUPET
  • Private sector involvement in poultry and egg production spurring dollarisation
  • Hotel occupancy in Cuba falls to 21.5% in the first half of 2025
  • Possible Chinese investment in Cuban agro-industrial sugar sector discussed
  • Cuba’s official media laud relations with North Korea

08 September 2025, Issue 1292

The Caribbean Council is able to provide further detail about all of the stories in Cuba Briefing. If you would like a more detailed insight into any of the content of today’s issue, please get in touch

Read More

Cuban operating environment proves challenging for Sherritt

01 September 2025

The Canadian miner Sherritt International Corporation which mines nickel and cobalt in Cuba then refines it, has reported to investors that in the six months ended 30 June 2025, the operating environment in Cuba and hardening US policies have impacted negatively on its operations.

Leon Binedell, the Executive Chairman, President and CEO of Sherritt, said in a statement, “Extensive challenges within Cuba’s operating environment spurred by the escalating US policies against Cuba are continuing unabated.” These, he reported, had “directly impacted our Cuban operations and particularly at Moa, resulting in lower-than-expected production of mixed sulphides.”

He also noted in a second quarter report and guidance, that a shortage of skilled labour, and frequent blackouts contributed to a deterioration in results causing the company to revise its production forecasts for 2025 downward, from 33,000 to 27,000 tons of nickel, and from 3,600 to 3,000 tons of cobalt.

Looking ahead, Binedell was more optimistic. Observing that the company with its Cuban partners had previously been able to address setbacks, he said that Sherritt had implemented mitigation strategies to protect its interests and operations in Cuba. “We have confidence that we will overcome the current situation; however, it may take additional time to resolve these near-term challenges and to meet our full expansion potential at Moa,” he stated.

However, noting that in the short term the company’s ability to supplement the feed of mixed sulphides from its Moa joint venture to its refinery in Canada utilising inputs from China was very limited for reasons of cost, he told investors Sherritt’s metals production guidance for 2025 was being adjusted to reflect this reality.

Speaking about the company’s actions in Cuba to address the difficulties facing the 50/50 joint venture with its Cuban partnerCompania General de Niquel, he said that in addition to the recovery plan being implemented, Sherritt would now provide additional expatriate personnel at Moa, and a replacement gas well would be drilled by CUPET to maintain power production at its Energas SA joint venture. The company would also, he noted, implement significant cost reduction measures at Sherritt‘s operations in Canada, saving approximately C$20mn (US$14.5mn) annually in addition to the C$17mn (US$12.3mn) cost reduction measures introduced in 2024.

“While the nickel price remains under pressure, we expect our corrective actions and the completion of the Moa JV’s phase two expansion to translate into stronger performance ahead,” Sherritt’s CEO told investors. It “remains confident that the strategy adopted and long-term outlook will enable it to capitalise on a market recovery,” he said.

In a press release Binedell indicated that finished nickel and cobalt production at the Moa Joint Venture in the second quarter of 2025 was 3,431 tonnes and Sherritt’s share was 389 tonnes. Electricity production in the same period by Energas SA at its Varadero facility, he noted, was 176 GWh with the facility continuing to provide frequency control to help support the stability of the Cuban national power grid. Sherritt holds a 33.3% interest in Energas SA with Unión Eléctrica (UNE) and Cubapetróleo (CUPET).

In other updates on the company’s Cuba operations, Binedell noted:

  • Sherritt anticipates higher second half production on the back of the commissioning and ramp up of a sixth leach train at Moa, and the implementation of a recovery plan, with the agreement of its joint venture partners, see greater expatriate involvement in the recovery of production.
  • A new tailings facility is expected to be commissioned in the second half of 2026.
  • Phase two of the Moa JV expansion is in the final stage of commissioning. Ramp up is expected in the second part of 2025.
  • Energas’ service to support the stability of the Cuban electricity grid is expected to be fully paid for throughout 2025.
  • Cuba Petróleo (CUPET) is undertaking work to replace declining gas production from one of its legacy wells. Lower gas production from a compromised gas well is being partly offset by increased gas production from a new well that came online in the fourth quarter of 2024, with the replacement well expected to be in production in the third quarter of 2025.
  • The interruption of gas supply from a legacy CUPET well is now expected to see estimated electricity production for the year at the lower end of the 2025 guidance range of 800 GWh to 850 GWh.

Highlights in this issue:

  • Fall in Canadian visitor arrivals slowing but overall visitor numbers still 23% down at end of July
  • Analysis suggests worst ever Cuban sugar harvest in over a century
  • Unspent wages to be distributed to some state workers to retain their commitment
  • Russia considering creating a logistics hub at Mariel for LAC trade
  • Vietnam and Cuba agree to deepen security cooperation

01 September 2025, Issue 1291

The Caribbean Council is able to provide further detail about all of the stories in Cuba Briefing. If you would like a more detailed insight into any of the content of today’s issue, please get in touch

Read More

National Assembly and Party meetings suggest uncertain period lies ahead

28 July 2025

Speeches and interventions made during the recently ended meeting of Cuba’s National Assembly and an earlier plenary session of the Central Committee of Cuba’s Communist Party suggest that the island may be entering a period of increased economic uncertainty, that government may struggle to deliver its economic objectives, and could find it hard to satisfy citizens’ concerns.

In particular, remarks made by the Minister of Economy and Planning (MEP), Joaquín Alonso, to National Assembly members made clear the enormity of the economic challenge government must overcome to recover past economic performance and restore growth.

In his detailed and often frank remarks, made during both full and working sessions, he set out the depth of the problems that must be addressed in the coming months and their interconnected nature.

During the four days of meetings the MEP Minister emphasised that now that the country’s fiscal deficit has been reduced, managing, controlling, and allocating foreign currency and earning more from exports will all be essential if the country’s deteriorating energy supply, insufficient food production, and its weak manufacturing output are to be addressed.

To this end, Alonso told delegates, the economy and its management “must now evolve and adapt,” against a background of the “persistence of a complex economic warfare scenario, in which risks are heightened, threats, and tensions are intensifying.”

Moving forward, Cuba’s Economy and Planning Minister said, now means doing everything possible to increase exports and foreign currency earnings and remittances, finding new sources of foreign direct investment, and identifying innovative sources of financing, “while containing current expenses and postponing non-essential investments.”

The goal now, he said, “is to boost the country’s foreign currency generation through all possible channels; continue to promote productive activities, with an emphasis on domestic food production and greater utilisation of all industrial capacities; and to strengthen the development, management, and monitoring of territorial food balances.”

All of which, Alonso stressed, must be delivered at the same time as other actions are being introduced “to extract excess national currency in circulation, and influence monetary, fiscal, and price control.”

Whether Cuba can achieve this and maintain the unity and commitment necessary to turn the economy around is less certain.

In his closing speech to the Communist Party’s Central Committee plenary held on 4-5 July, President Díaz-Canel made clear that under the leadership of the Communist Party, Cuba would continue to pursue its present economic and political path in a largely unrevised form as Cuba, he said, is now “a country at war.”

His promise, a twenty first century Cuban version of Winston Churchill’s 1940 message of an outlook that promises only ‘blood, toil, tears, and sweat,’ in the near term, sought to engage cadres – the politically committed – to work with the very many Cubans who are uncertain about the future to encourage hope.

His remarks suggested real concern exists at the level of the Central Committee of the Communist Party about losing the support of the young, and the need to do more politically to retain and increase their support. Other lines in his closing remarks indicated fear of an externally engineered social break down this summer, and the need to constantly rethink in practical terms the Party and government’s response to complex interrelated economic problems at a time of significantly diminished resources.

There was also an implied concern that the accelerating breakdown of international norms could mean that almost any action may now be possible against Cuba by the US and the Cuban leadership’s much-hated opposition in exile; unease that the Cuban people will blame the Communist Party rather than Washington for the present economic crisis; anxiety about the Communist Party’s ability to communicate hope in a much changed country, especially to the younger generation; and apprehension that it will lose its moral authority unless its cadres are successfully revitalised.

A hot summer of energy outages, shortages of water, transport, food, and other necessities now threaten. In recent months, street protests have been sporadic, small, and localised. However, government is clearly concerned that if Cubans’ legitimate concerns are not addressed and are fanned by external actors, a much wider breakdown of social cohesion and national unity is possible.

In the past, Cuban’s deep-rooted sense of nationalism has overcome such doubts. However, the more recent pivot to repression has created disenchantment about the future especially among those born long after Cuba’s conservative historic generation.

When Díaz-Canel addressed the Central Committee plenary he recognised that almost all the solutions now lie in achieving self-sufficiency. Cuba’s Communist Party and government must do much more to deliver “what the people are expecting from us” through “concrete and immediate actions that will help overcome the profound economic crisis” the island is facing, he stated.

The inference is that if Government and Cuba’s political leadership fail to rapidly create opportunity and a modern vibrant economy that encourages hope, the nature of future change could become unpredictable.

This issue provides more detail of the breadth of the economic challenge facing the island.

Detailed coverage of the recently held ninth Cuban Communist Party Plenary providing the political context to the National Assembly meetings can be found in Cuba Briefing 14 July 2025. Coverage of the principal speeches made during the 16-18 July plenary session of the National Assembly can be found in Cuba Briefing 21 July 2025.

Highlights in this issue:

  • Minister of the Economy sets out key economic challenges government must address
  • Visitor arrivals fall by 25% in first half of 2025
  • Power outages described as a sensitive political issue for the Communist Party
  • Legislators warn of need to speed up provincial approval of new non-state MSMEs
  • Vietnam expresses concern about Cuban business environment

28 July 2025, Issue 1290

 The Caribbean Council is able to provide further detail about all of the stories in Cuba Briefing. If you would like a more detailed insight into any of the content of today’s issue, please get in touch.

Read More

National Assembly told Cuba facing ‘a most difficult moment’ in its history

21 July 2025

Describing the present moment as being amongst the most difficult in recent Cuban history, President Díaz-Canel has called on all Cubans to commit their energy and effort to finding solutions to meet the challenges now facing the country.

“This is not the first time, nor will it be the last, that the Revolution faces its ‘most difficult moment,’ although it will always seem so to us,” he told the closing session of Cuba’s weeklong National Assembly.

His remarks came at the end of two days of meetings of its working commissions – sometimes held jointly in recognition of the urgent need for cross-cutting solutions – followed by a further two days in plenary sessions involving all delegates.

The presentations, including the doubts and concerns voiced by some elected members in their interventions, were reported at length in Cuba’s official broadcast, print, and online media.

The often-frank comments made by Ministers sought to explain to Cubans and their representatives the complex nature of finding and delivering solutions to the critical macro-economic problems the island faces if it is to restore growth. Ministers also emphasised the need to achieve greater understanding and popular support for the measures being introduced when nationwide energy outages, shortages of food and medicines, dollarisation, and increased US pressure are seeing localised protests threaten wider social instability.

This issue of Cuba Briefing is largely dedicated to coverage of the main economic announcements and general themes emerging from the National Assembly meeting. Next weeks’ issue, the last before the summer break, will provide a general analysis, additional detail, and as usual a wider range of news Cuba-related news.

Detailed coverage of the recently held ninth Cuban Communist Party Plenary providing thepolitical context to the National Assembly meetings can be found in Cuba Briefing 14 July 2025.

Highlights in this issue:

  • President says gravity of economic situation requires whole nation’s efforts to resolve
  • Economy Minister’s frank remarks indicate economic outlook will remain challenging
  • Marrero outlines partial progress with economic reforms, sets out plans for rest of 2025
  • Power generation ‘able to meet basic national demand by end of year’
  • Senior Minister resigns following extraordinary intervention

21 July 2025, Issue 1289

 The Caribbean Council is able to provide further detail about all of the stories in Cuba Briefing. If you would like a more detailed insight into any of the content of today’s issue, please get in touch.

Read More

Communist Party told unity, authority, self-sufficiency now essential

14 July 2025

Cuba’s President has said that Cuba is now “a country at war.”

It is, he told a Central Committee plenary of Cuba’s Communist Party held on 4-5 July, at risk from a “Machiavellian combination” of actions by the US Administration. Washington “not only aims to destroy the scarce resources” that Cuba has, he said, but is also trying to create “a political and social crisis that will explode during the summer.”

To respond, he stated, Cuba’s Communist Party (PCC) and government must do much more to deliver “what the people are expecting from us” through “concrete and immediate actions that will help overcome the profound economic crisis” the island is facing.

Referring to the new US Presidential National Security Memorandum on Cuba (See Cuba Briefing 7 July 2025), President Díaz-Canel said that the US Administration intends intensifying its economic war with the aim of “fracturing” the nation through actions “damaging to the spiritual fabric” of the country.

“The United States government, he told the closing session, has “thus decided to maintain and strengthen the pressure, cutting off almost all bilateral diplomatic contact with Cuba and intensifying its campaign to discredit the country and intimidate third parties, primarily Latin Americans and Europeans, as well as Caribbean countries.”

Main themes indicate no change of direction

Speaking as the First Secretary of the country’s Communist Party and at the end of two days of what he described as “tough debates,” he made clear that Cuba’s Communist Party has decided that in the face of a situation “fraught with threats and difficulties” it would continue to pursue its present economic and political path in a largely unrevised form.

In doing so, he said, the PCC would work to strengthen unity, ensuring the delivery of government’s programme to reinvigorate the economy, perfect its ideological work, and emphasise the political training of new generations, while confronting “negative trends present in society.”

His remarks, which offered little that was new or any sense of a change of direction, had several main themes.

Of these the most prominent was real concern about losing the support of the young and the need to do more politically to retain and increase their support. Other lines in his closing remarks suggested fear of an externally engineered social break down, and the need to constantly rethink in practical terms the Party and government’s response to complex interrelated economic problems at a time of significantly diminished resources. His address also implied concern that the breakdown of international norms, might mean that almost any action might now be possible against Cuba by the US and the Cuban leadership’s much-hated exile opposition in the US. Other themes indicated a fear that the Cuban people will blame the Communist Party rather than Washington for the present crisis; anxiety about communicating hope in a changed country, especially to young people; and concern that the PCC will lose its moral authority unless its cadres are successfully revitalised.

Solutions said to depend “entirely” on leadership of Communist Party

During his address, Díaz-Canel indicated that the Central Committee’s two days of discussion had reaffirmed that “solutions depend entirely on us.” In a “highly challenging and threatening context” involving economic warfare, “disinformation, distortion, and hatred,” he stressed, public opinion had “forced us to continually rethink our scenarios of action and resistance tactics without compromising our strategy.”

This meant, he said, “defending unity” had to be the priority for the PCC, because “the very existence of the Revolution depends on it.” He warned however that it cannot be a slogan. Rather, he said, it required action that fosters the participation of the people, and young people especially in relation to ideology and the economy. In doing so, he placed emphasis on the importance of “revolutionary analysis and debate that provides ideas, solutions, and measures to enrich the difficult decision-making process.” He also underlined the need to monitor “the functioning and internal life” of grassroots organisations to ensure that all cadres in leadership positions are implementing all that was agreed at the Communist Party’s last Congress held in 2021.

Addressing international events, Díaz-Canel noted how Cuba had watched “the alarming impunity with which the US and Israeli governments had attacked Iran, without “the slightest vigorous political response from the international community and its institutions”, and what he described as the “premeditated” way in which “genocide against the Palestinian people” is being undertaken. In doing so, he observed the impotence of [the UN’s] anti-democratic structure and what he described as “the complicit role of the large transnational media which, he said, was “generating the narrative and ignoring worldwide condemnation.”

Placing this in a Cuban context, he said that this required the PCC and Government to better inform the Cuban people in defence of national sovereignty and socialism. In this, he observed, social communication will play a decisive role, requiring greater timeliness, quality and articulation, especially through debate and dialogue with young people.

Priorities for the Communist Party in relation to economy outlined

During his lengthy address Díaz-Canel stressed the role of the PCC in relation to the delivery of the programme of economic reform first announced in December 2023. In particular, he noted that:

  • The most important task the Party must undertake is to ensure that Government’s macro-economic reform programme is implemented and is better understood nationally.
  • The proposals and ideas that emerged from the debate held at the recent Congress of the National Association of Cuban Economists should be incorporated into the programme (See Cuba Briefing 23 June 2025 for details).
  • State-owned and non-state-owned enterprises must be freed from the bureaucratic obstacles that still exist and are preventing them from fully utilising their potential in developing the country’s production.
  • It is now essential to increase potential foreign currency earnings in every way possible and, more importantly, efficiently utilise the limited available income.
  • Agriculture and the food industry must be given the highest priority as food sovereignty is essential.
  • Credit programmes for local producers, access to inputs, and fair prices for essential crops can stimulate production, reduce dependence on imports, and reduce foreign currency expenditure.
  • It is imperative to stabilise the national electricity system.
  • Cuba’s economic and social development model maintains the appropriate balance and relationship between centralisation and decentralisation, balancing macroeconomic stability with innovation, integrating economic actors “in an appropriate relationship”, attracting foreign direct investment, and by prioritising domestic production.

Communist Party told it must consolidate its authority

Speaking specifically about Cuba’s Communist Party, he stressed that “The defence of unity must prevail as task number one.” The Party, he said, “must be the force that revolutionises the Revolution.” This requires, he told meeting participants, it to “consolidate the authority earned by the merits of the historical generation and preserve the leadership and moral authority of the organisation.”

In practical terms, he said, this will require the strengthening of the Party’s “operating dynamics and the proactivity of its members in addressing society’s most pressing problems.” It must show, he stressed, a “genuine concern for the functioning of society …. with the power to convene and mobilise to defeat any plan by the enemies of the Cuban nation.” To this end, growth in Party membership, he said , must be a process that generates genuine interest and has a social impact. “Let’s enlist young people to participate with their natural enthusiasm in all the country’s crucial tasks. This way, we will revive the essence of the Revolution and the Party,” he told the PCC’s Central Committee.

He also sought to have its members reflect on the mechanics of periodic evaluations of cadres and members as to whether they are effectively influencing the methods used in local political work. “We owe it to ourselves to reflect deeply every day on how we carry out our functions as a partisan organisation.” Oversight, he said, must be complemented by involving the population in decision-making combined with ideological training.

Need for greater control over social behaviour stressed

Addressing Cuba’s deteriorating social environment, Cuba’s President indicated that greater control will be required by the authorities. Observing that “problems and behaviours that threaten socialist construction are dangerously accumulating”, he said that “some are reaching magnitudes and levels that are already unacceptable.” This he blamed on a lack of “oversight of approved documents” resulting in a failure to implement policies, laws, decrees, and other legal norms.

Cuba’s President went on to say that it will now be necessary for the Communist Party and Government to “maintain the intensity of integrated actions, prioritising preventive action with the urgent implementation of popular and institutional control.” He also stressed the need to wage a permanent and intense fight against crimes associated with drug trafficking and consumption.

Importance of positive international relations emphasised

In his remarks, Díaz-Canel stressed the importance Cuba places on retaining what he described as “a significant share of political influence in the region and globally.” This authority, he said, “well earned by our historical leaders and respected worldwide, is an authority that gives us a heard and influential voice in important international events.” Speaking about specific relationships he noted that in the case of the BRICS, Cuba is committed to expanding relations and harnessing their potential. “This is undoubtedly a novel alternative that we should support,” he told the PCC plenary.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, and given the electoral calendar in various countries, he observed, the political balance is expected to become more adverse than the scenario experienced in recent years.

In this context, the fraternal ties with Venezuela, the important and close relationship that has strengthened with Mexico in recent years, the ties with Nicaragua and Honduras, and the common position of CARICOM are pillars that we must protect, he said.

Díaz-Canel also noted that political and economic ties with China and Vietnam have continued to strengthen, and that both countries now play a growing and important role in the major economic challenges Cuba faces. By contrast he noted only that the political relationship with Russia is “consolidating,” and that Cuba will continue to promote its participation as an observer country in the Eurasian Economic Union.

Party Congress in 2026 and plans to commemorate Fidel Castro’s birth

During his address, Díaz-Canel described as “crucial” the Central Committee’s approval of a call for a ninth Communist Party Congress to be held in 2026. The Congress is Cuba’s highest decision-making body, setting the country’s political and economic direction for the ensuing multi-year period. The ninth, he said, will be “responsible for presenting a strategy for improving the Party’s work, both ideologically and socioeconomically …. and addressing the problems.” As such, he stated, “it must be a critical Congress, but one that also proposes and approves ways to overcome the current situation under conditions of even more severe gridlock.”

To achieve this, he told the plenary, the intention is that the broadest possible consultation on the congress documents will take place beforehand “with non-members, in sector-specific meetings, with experts on specific topics, in the governing boards and key structures of the Central State Administration agencies, the business system, the budget system, and with young people.” The ninth Congress of Cuba’s Communist Party is to take place on 16-19 April 2026.

Speaking about plans to commemorate the Centennial of the birth of Fidel Castro next year, Cuba’s President said it would “facilitate and ensure encounters between young people and history. Planned events, he stressed, must “transcend the logical nostalgia for the historical leader ….connecting it with current and future struggles.” The intention is, he said, to “reinforce socialist values, connect with new generations, and project his thinking in the face of current challenges.”

Highlights in this issue:

  • More visitors sought from China, Turkey, Russia, and Latin America
  • Marrero admits government is dissatisfied with its failure to deliver
  • State Department sanctions Cuba’s President, extends US restricted hotels list
  • Positive Cuba-China biotech experience to be outlined during belt and road events
  • Mexico becoming a major supplier of gasoline and other fuels

14 July 2025, Issue 1288

 The Caribbean Council is able to provide further detail about all of the stories in Cuba Briefing. If you would like a more detailed insight into any of the content of today’s issue, please get in touch.

Read More

New US Cuba security policy set to widen secondary sanctions risk

07 July 2025

President Trump has signed a National Security Memorandum, tightening and extending significantly US sanctions on Cuba.

The order is expected to expose non-US companies to greater secondary US sanctions risk if they transact or do business with any of the many Cuban enterprises and their subsidiaries that are linked to Cuban military and certain other state enterprises. The related regulations are expected to be published in early August.

The 30 June security memorandum instructs Cabinet members and federal agencies to seek to end “economic practices that disproportionately benefit the Cuban government or its military, intelligence, or security agencies or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people.”

Approach intended to widen extraterritorial nature of sanctions

The 30 June memorandum, in part, is intended to extend secondary sanctions in such a way as to prevent or deter businesses and entities in third countries from trading with and investing in Cuba. The approach was trailed earlier this year by the outgoing US Special Envoy for Latin America, Mauricio Claver-Carone. (See Cuba Briefing 10 March 2025).

A day after the document was signed by President Trump, the Miami Herald, citing ‘a source with knowledge of the new regulations’ reported that “the Trump administration will punish foreign companies that do business with military companies in Cuba.” According to the publication’s unnamed source, “sanctions will target any company providing direct or indirect support to companies directly or indirectly owned by the Cuban military,” thereby effectively expanding the US embargo to affect companies from third countries.

If this proves to be correct, among the international companies and smaller US businesses that may now be affected are those providing services, investing in, or trading with sectors including tourism, energy, fuel supply, telecoms, mineral extraction, financial services, port operations, the Mariel Economic Development Zone, and a wide range of other economic activities including those involving the supply of food, spares and equipment all of which Cuban military enterprises are closely involved in.

In this context the new security memorandum specifically mentions the military linked Cuban conglomerate GAESA which has many subsidiaries that overseas companies commonly transact their Cuba related business through. As such the yet to be published regulations could affect, for example, overseas business relationships with Gaviota that owns the hotels leased to or run by foreign hotel chains from Canada, Spain, Indonesia, India, Portugal and elsewhere. GAESA subsidiaries also operate many grocery stores, logistics operations, service stations, and other businesses in Cuba in convertible currency, sometimes undertaking such arrangements through subsidiaries based in third countries.

Number of sanctioned Cuban officials to increase significantly

Also affecting overseas engagement with Cuba, the memorandum instructs the US Treasury to significantly expand the number of sanctioned ministers, vice ministers, officials above a certain rank, senior trades unionists, senior media professionals, and members and employees of the Supreme Court.

The extended US sanctions list is also expected to include members and employees of the National Assembly; members of any provincial assembly; higher level officials of all Cuban ministries and state agencies; employees of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of the Armed Forces; and sector heads of the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution.

New regulations expected in 30 days

The Presidential directive, which is now with leading US Cabinet members and the heads of multiple US government agencies, requires them to review US policy toward Cuba, examine current sanctions, respond to the new objectives set, and enforce or make stronger within 30 days the proposed actions.

To achieve this, the document mandates that “within 30 days of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce, as appropriate, and in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Transportation, will initiate a process to adjust current regulations relating to transactions with Cuba.”

This will require the State Department identifying Cuban entities or sub-entities such as GAESA, “under the control of, or act for or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel,” where their direct or indirect financial transactions disproportionately “benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise.” In such cases “direct or indirect” financial transactions will be prohibited.

The executive order further includes measures that seek to :

  • Prioritise, making more effective “adherence to the statutory ban on US tourism to Cuba” by extending related measures introduced during the President’s first term.
  • Require mandatory record-keeping of all US Cuba travel-related transactions for at least five years.
  • Restrict US educational tours to groups by requiring that educational travel is for legitimate educational purposes and organised and run only by US citizensunder the auspices of an organisation subject to the jurisdiction of the US with a representative of the sponsoring body accompanying such travellers.
  • Require the US Treasury to conduct regular audits of travel to Cuba.
  • Seek to expand internet access and the unimpeded flow of information to Cubans.
  • Oppose calls “in the United Nations and other international forums” to lift the US embargo “until a transitional government is established in Cuba,” and to submit “periodic reports on whether the conditions for a transitional government exist in Cuba.”
  • End the “wet foot, dry foot” policy which the White House says “encouraged thousands of Cuban citizens to risk their lives to travel illegally to the United States,” by not reinstating the Cuban Adjustment Act.
  • Increase efforts to support the Cuban people through the expansion of internet services, press freedom, free enterprise, free association, and legal travel.
  • Require the US Attorney General to submit a report to the president within 90 days “on matters related to fugitives from US justice living in Cuba or being harboured by the Cuban government.”
  • Convene a working group, comprised of relevant agencies, including the Cuban Broadcasting Office, and appropriate non-governmental organisations and private sector entities, to examine technological challenges and opportunities for expanding Internet access in Cuba.
  • Develop programmes and activities through the Federal Government that “foster freedom of expression through independent media and Internet freedom so that the Cuban people may enjoy the free and unregulated flow of information.”

The document also includes a series of catch-all objectives indicating that US interests in Cuba include: advancing human rights; encouraging the growth of a Cuban private sector independent of government control; enforcing final orders of removal against Cuban nationals in the United States; protecting the national security and public health and safety of the US, including through “proper engagement on criminal cases;” working to ensure the return of fugitives from American justice living in Cuba; supporting US agriculture and protecting plant and animal health; advancing the understanding of the US regarding scientific and environmental challenges; and facilitating safe civil aviation.

The Security Memorandum makes clear that the new measures should not eliminate US actions that in Washington’s eyes provide tools to engineer change in Cuba. These include “supporting programmes to build democracy in Cuba; air and sea operations that support permitted travel, cargo, or commerce; the acquisition of visas for permitted travel; the expansion of direct telecommunications and internet access; and the sale of agricultural products, medicines, and medical devices sold to Cuba as allowed for under US legislation.

The text also indicates that the updated policy should not affect “the sending, processing, or receiving of authorised remittances” or seek to “otherwise promote the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.”

According to preamble to the body of the text, White House Cuba policy in future “will be guided by the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, as well as by solidarity with the Cuban people.” Its text however makes clear that the Trump Administration “will continue to evaluate its policies.”

The full text of the memorandum can be found at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/06/national-security-presidential-memorandum-nspm-5/

An accompanying White House fact sheet on the order can be read at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/06/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-strengthens-the-policy-of-the-united-states-toward-cuba/

Cuba says new US policy aggressive and hegemonic

In an initial response, President Díaz-Canel condemned the measures announced by the White House as a continuation of a “merciless economic war” that severely limits the possibilities for the country’s commercial and financial development. Writing on X, he observed that the US Administration’s new aggressive plan against Cuba, responds to narrow US interests. The goal, he said is “to cause as much damage and suffering as possible to the people. The impact will be felt, but we will not be defeated.”

Speaking live on the television programme Mesa Redonda on 2 July, Cuba’s Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, Carlos Fernández de Cossío, said that the Memorandum serves to justify the actions the White House is already implementing or will adopt in the future. The measures will, he said “cause suffering to the people, affecting the economy and the country’s development in sensitive areas such as tourism, fuel supply, electricity generation , food production, and many other areas.” The memorandum, he said threatens individuals and companies that legally export to the Caribbean country from the United States to Cuba’s private sector. He stressed, however, that Cuba has overcome moments of greater complexity. Today “we have the capacity, organisation, wisdom, and experience to overcome this new aggression from the imperialist power,” he told viewers.

In a formal statement Cuba’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MINREX) categorically “denounced and rejected” the latest “infamous document” and an earlier version produced by the first Trump Administration in June 2017. It described the new US Security Memorandum as a clear expression “of that country’s aggressive behaviour,” observing that its objective, is “economic coercion as a weapon of aggression against a sovereign country, with the aim of breaking the political will of the entire nation and subjecting it to the hegemonic dictatorship of the US.”

“The rulers and politicians of the United States have the audacity to declare that they act in this way for the good of the Cuban people,” MIREX wrote. Indicating that “the challenges Cuba faces are significant and daunting,” MINREX noted, “The US government doesn’t care that Cuba is a peaceful, stable, supportive country with friendly relations with virtually the entire world. Its policy serves the narrow interests of a corrupt, anti-Cuban clique that has made aggression against its neighbours a way of life and a very lucrative business.”

Security memorandum creates new uncertainties

The US National Security Memorandum was signed just days before Cuba’s Communist Party and its National Assembly were due to meet, in part to review the delivery of its slow-moving macroeconomic reform process, first announced in December 2023. It comes as the Cuban government and Communist Party continue to call for unity in the face of economic and social uncertainty as they try to address administrative failures, continuing shortages of food and essential supplies, power outages, a lack of fuel, and inadequate foreign exchange.

Although the Trump administration claims that its objective is change led by the Cuban people, the new policy if strictly enforced by Washington appears likely to create new hardships, increasing the possibility of illegal migration and social instability. Paradoxically, It comes at a time when the US is also seeking to remove to Cuba or elsewhere, the tens of thousands of Cubans who migrated legally to the US under the Biden era humanitarian parole programme; a measure that offered a pathway to eventual US citizenship.

How the Cuban government responds beyond rhetoric to the tightening of sanctions remains to be seen. If the new sanctions significantly further restrict the country’s ability to earn foreign currency and trade with existing international partners and the daily experience of many Cubans worsens, despite the strength of Cuban nationalism, it appears likely that the Communist Party and government, may find themselves subject to new domestically led social and political pressure.

Equally uncertain is the reaction of Cuba’s increasingly close allies, China and Russia, and its other hemispheric and western trade and investment partners. China, which rapidly condemned the new US measures (see China section in the full issue) and Russia, in different ways, have been seeking new economic and strategic opportunity in Cuba.

While the Trump Administration’s actions may strengthen their hand, less certain is how the island’s trading partners in Europe, Canada, Mexico, Brazil and elsewhere will react. They oppose US extraterritoriality and sanctions in relation to Cuba. Instead, they largely want to see gradual economic and political reform enabling the emergence of stable more liberal market-oriented Cuban political system. However, in the face of their overriding desire to retain a positive relationship with Washington, their reaction when the new regulations are published, will be telling.

Highlights in this issue:

  • Cuban companies and individuals exempted from duties on renewable energy related imports
  • Russian Transport Ministry seeking alternative funding for Cuban railways upgrade
  • Air China inaugurates direct air cargo service to and from Havana
  • Spain activates US$442mn Cuba debt conversion programme
  • Cuba tells Eurasian Bloc leaders island can become their logistics bridge to Latin America

07 July 2025, Issue 1287

 The Caribbean Council is able to provide further detail about all of the stories in Cuba Briefing. If you would like a more detailed insight into any of the content of today’s issue, please get in touch.

Read More

ETECSA modifies internet rates – issue remains socially, politically sensitive

23 June 2025

In a new response to citizen and student concern about recent increases in the cost of mobile internet access, the state telecoms company ETECSA has announced limited modifications to its plans.

A previous announcement led to student unrest and more generally, widespread national criticism on social media. The issue remains politically and socially sensitive.

So sensitive was the subsequent student reaction that Cuba’s leadership fearing wider student unrest, a broadening of issues of concern, and the possibility of external exploitation, that Cuba’s President  immediately acknowledged that the students were “using their constitutional right” …. “within the framework of institutionality.” They had  demanded solutions, he said, that would be resolved through dialogue and flexibility. (Full background Cuba Briefing 9 and 16 June 2025)

ETECSA announce limited modifications

Announcing on 19 June an intermediate plan that will make available an additional 2 gigabytes (gb) for CUP1,200 for 35 days, ETECSA said that this will allow “for a greater number of mobile phone users to have greater access to the Internet.” Company executives said that the new intermediate plan, offers a lower and more affordable price than the previously announced add-on 3gb for CUP3,360, first announced on 30 May. In doing so,  they recognised that the new plan still does not meet the needs of many customers.

Although the company’s rationale is that the price increases will enable ETECSA to improve its infrastructure and services, most subsequent online reaction published in Cuba’s official media and on social media platforms remains critical. Many posts make the point that all additional pricing above the maximum initial purchase is beyond the means of many Cubans and effectively dollarises add-ons and limits access to the internet.

ETECSA’s executives told the media that it continues  working with a group of organisations and institutions to find solutions that will allow both students and other sectors to have greater access to the internet, whether through institutions or by some other means. It also confirmed that a specific plan for university students is being implemented.

For university students, the company will allow the purchase of a 6gb plan for CUP360 as a one-time monthly purchase and in addition a single CUP360 balance top-up. For students to access this sector-based plan they must be registered in the company’s dedicated database.

Yusmany Rojas, Deputy Director of the company’s commercial vice presidency, told Cuban journalists that she recognised that the new offering still does not meet the needs of a portion of the population that consumes more than the current availability. However, it is all the company can provide, she said, given the current situation and the impact on ETECSA’s economic recovery. According to Cubadebate, a recent study by the telecoms company, indicates that 38% of users in Cuba consume more than 8gb a month.

Highlights in this issue: 

  • Economists’ proposals only a ‘working guide’ for Cuban ministries
  • Tabacuba says production is expected to recover this year
  • Fernández de Cossío says Cuba has no dialogue with Trump Administration
  • Vietnamese military instructed to deepen cooperation, heighten profile in Cuba
  • Catholic Bishops issue unusually direct message about the crisis facing many Cubans

Student group submits forty recommendations

The announcement follows Cuban media reports that the multidisciplinary group of university students formed by the Communist Party-linked Federation of University Students (FEU) developed more than 40 proposals suggesting ways in which ETECSA might address student concerns about the pricing of mobile data in relation to their needs.

According to Litza González, the National Vice President of the FEU, these will now be presented and discussed in the University Councils of each academic institution, while the FEU-convened group “will support the company (ETECSA) in implementing the projects based on their feasibility.”

The reported recommendations relate to improving ETECSA’s communications strategy, the development by the company of a crisis manual, and the creation of mechanisms to increase public feedback. Cubadebate quoted González as saying that the student group also undertook a detailed analysis of the concerns raised by the universities and considered pricing policies, data packages, and sectorisation, as well as the creation of a work system to evaluate the progress of the initiatives presented.

The online platform quoted  Tania Velázquez, the President of ETECSA, as saying that the dialogue had been “enriching” and had been “one of frankness, openness, and exchange.” Some 40 ETECSA specialists participated in the meetings. “Our interest is to make people aware of the reality of our company and to seek joint solutions,” she observed. Quoting several students,  Cubadebate  reported that while the creation of the group by the FEU had enabled “young university students to make medium- and long-term proposals,” “disagreement and dissatisfaction” had been present.

Government praises students

In other reported comments, government sought to commend students while suggesting in their case that future improvements might be possible

Deputy Prime Minister, Eduardo Martínez, highlighted  the “talent and collective intelligence of the students.” “We must take advantage of this,” he said, adding that both President Díaz-Canel and the Prime Minister were aware of the meetings. “There are things that may not be possible in the short term, but they can be structured through projects,” he said, while reiterating the need to implement measures that allow for the sustainability and improvement of ETECSA’s services. The student group will meet again in September.

Separately, the official publication Juventud Rebelde emphasised the FEU’s assurances of the legitimacy of the process it was overseeing, noting the students’ “frank and robust debate,” and their questions and proposals. It quoted several as putting forward ideas relating to marketing, pricing, the company’s technology, expanding bandwidth at higher education centres, and installing Wi-Fi hotspots.

The multidisciplinary group’s proposals followed days of meetings with representatives of ETECSA in response to the peaceful student protests in multiple university faculties after the company’s badly misjudged late May announcement.

23 June 2025, Issue 1285

 The Caribbean Council is able to provide further detail about all of the stories in Cuba Briefing. If you would like a more detailed insight into any of the content of today’s issue, please get in touch.

Read More

Government responds to  student protests after sharp internet price hike 

09 June 2025

Cuba’s President has accused outside forces of trying to create unrest and instability following a badly mishandled announcement on 30 May of an immediate sharp increase in mobile internet rates by the state telecoms provider ETECSA

To the concern of government, which surprisingly had not foreseen the likely response, ETECSA’s statement was rapidly followed by widespread condemnation on social media and peaceful protests by students in several university faculties including at the University of Havana.

At press time, government remained in an ongoing dialogue with student groups whose concerns focus on the need for unlimited internet access to complete their studies, rather than on the concessions offered by ETECSA following its initial announcement.

Other student concerns expressed in assemblies and on social media criticised the initial failure of the national leadership of Communist Party-linked representative student bodies such as the Federation of University Students (FEU), to respond to the wishes of its faculty branches in relation to the issue.

Later in the week to try to address student concerns, Ricardo Rodríguez, the National President of the FEU told Juventud Rebelde that a multidisciplinary group aimed to analyse student opinion and proposals, as well as to work together with ETECSA to find solutions.

President recognises widespread dissatisfaction

Speaking alongside representatives of ETECSA on 6 June on his podcast ‘Desde la Presidencia’, President Díaz-Canel recognised “the dissatisfaction among the population, the misunderstandings, and the justifiable criticisms that have been levelled at the centre of the Party, the Government, and also the Ministry of Communications and ETECSA.”

These errors,” he said, “have caused misunderstanding, discontent, and criticism among the population, but they have also led to hateful, counterrevolutionary platforms coordinating a total campaign of discredit, slander, and lies that has sought to involve, with the worst tricks, one of the social sectors inseparable from the soul of the Revolution: our students, our beloved students, and the Cuban youth.”

His remarks followed meetings and peaceful protests in some university faculties as well as student criticism of the Communist Party youth-related bodies – the Federation of University Students (FEU), the Federation of Middle Level Education Students (FEEM), and the Union of Young Communists (UJC) – for failing to represent their views on the issue.

Recognising “that students, using their constitutional right, have demanded solutions from ETECSA, and from our government as well,” and that most have done so “within the framework of institutionality,” Díaz-Canel, asserted that their concerns were being hijacked.

Days after the ETECSA announcement, he said, an offensive had been launched “laden with lies, with posters and videos posted on social media” using he said, “manipulated images of university rallies and activities, to which fake photos and sound have been added.”

Highlights in this issue: 

  • ETECSA says price hike is essential to assure future viability and to fund investment
  • Rebuffed by State Department Cuban officials express concern about US intentions
  • EU-Cuba PDCA Council to meet later this year
  • Cuba stresses importance of continuity in its dialogue with Vatican
  • Cuba confirms its commitment to China’s concept of a ‘shared future’

Government to resolve issues with students through dialogue, flexibility

In an indication of the sensitivity of the issue and the need for caution about how the still unresolved issues are addressed,  Cuba’s President noted on his podcast that government was trying to resolve the issue. It was doing so, he said, through dialogue.

“We have spoken with the students, they have had the opportunity to raise their concerns, and in fact, a set of responses have been provided,” he said.

However, in doing so he indicated a willingness “to continue seeking solutions, to continue expanding these measures as appropriately as possible, in line with the objectives we have set and in light of (students’) need.”

In his remarks Cuba’s President accepted that there had been “errors in the design” and “errors in the communication of the measures, perhaps because we lacked the necessary explanations and failed to consider the different needs and demands of each sector.” But failing to implement the measures would, he said, “mean forgoing revenue, without which we would be accelerating the already imminent collapse of the [ETECSA] service as a whole.”

Accepting that “we have underestimated the importance of these tools in such a complex scenario,” Cuba’s President indicated that further flexibility may be possible.

Based on dialogue and acknowledging errors, he said, “corrections have been made to the initial proposals …. and the possibility of further corrections have not been ruled out.” He also noted that “clear guidance on the actions the Party and the Government must take to address the problem, taking into account the criticisms and suggestions” had been provided.

ETECSA apologises

Speaking on the same programme, the President of ETECSA, Tania Velázquez,  said: “We have had failures in the implementation process, in the very design of the implementation of the measures.” “I cannot stop offering and apologising to our people, because this entire situation that has been generated by our system, by our company, by our service, forces us to do so. We cannot stop doing so, because it is something we deeply regret.”

News agencies report student concerns continue in some locations

The French news agency AFP reported days after the first announcement ETECSA that groups within some universities have called on students not to attend classes or are seeking a legal challenge against ETECSA’s decision based on what they believe to be a breach of contract. It quoted one student statement posted on Telegram as saying: “We invite the administration of our University of Havana to recognise this protest as legitimate in order to (…) avoid misrepresentation of our revolutionary and honest intentions.”

In response, AFP reported, the University of Havana administration warned on Facebook that “nothing and no one will interrupt our teaching processes with meetings that are completely removed from the spirit that has animated exchanges with student and youth organisations.”

Later in the week, EFE reported after visiting the University of Havana campus, that meetings continue at different schools to find solutions. Noting the newfound willingness of young people to articulate their opinions in this way, it wrote that “while not widespread or destabilising”, their concerns are “significant and striking because they represent unprecedented signs of unrest in Cuban universities, especially in the current context of the severe polycrisis and uncertainty.”

Communist Party calls for unity

Speaking earlier in the week and following the announcement by ETECSA that it would vary its pricing policy for students to its suddenly announced changes, Roberto Morales, the Secretary for Organisation of  the Central Committee of Cuba’s Communist Party, denounced “media manipulations and opportunistic distortions …. taking advantage of our people’s legitimate concerns regarding necessary measures, such as those recently announced by ETECSA.” 

Calling for “revolutionary unity” in the face of “subversive campaigns and actions to destroy the Revolution,” he  referred to student discontent triggered by concerns about ETECSA’s rate hike, suggesting that “unity will prevent the incitement against young Cuban university students from taking the course of violence, contempt, and discord with the institutions to which their usual promoters aspire.”

Indicating that enemies “have taken advantage of legitimate concerns and natural dissent in a society to call for disorder and to obscure the value of spaces for dialogue, collective analysis, and listening ….” he said  that “the maturity of this people and, above all, of its youth, united in representative organisations like the FEU, has known how to apply the necessary and just brake, so that unfounded chaos has no entry point.”

ETECSA decision initially criticised by many Cubans

Over the weekend of 1-2 June, following the poorly handled announcement by ETECSA, criticism was widespread on social media, among students, and in in some official publications.

In developments that triggered a rapid response from Government and ETECSA, faculty groups affiliated to the FEU publicly criticised the telecoms provider’s sudden announcement of price hikes, as did social media users, one official publication, and others whose opinions normally reflect government’s view.

In the two days after the new prices were announced, FEU branches representing faculties of the University of Havana and the Higher Institute of International Relations, and groups representing medical sciences expressed their dissatisfaction while making clear their loyalty to government.

In doing so they variously observed that the ETECSA announcement represented  “a huge lack of respect for the Cuban people” and limited university students’ ability to learn, research, and develop in an increasingly digital world. In doing so they expressed an openness to dialogue and to seeking solutions.

In a separate and unusual development, an editorial in Girón, the official provincial publication for Matanzas,  while recognising the financial constraints  ETECSA was operating under, criticised the huge price increase and other measures announced, noting they were trending on social media and in private conversations.  Writing on its Facebook page, Girón observed that connectivity is not a luxury, but “a tool for work, study, communication, and development,” before asking whether there was not “a middle ground between ETECSA’s financial strangulation and the economic strangulation of users?” 

” Girón understands the urgency of foreign currency that motivated ETECSA. The blockade is real, the crisis is fierce. But we believe that, to support this process and provide accurate and truthful information to the people and users detailed and public explanations of the investment and improvement plan are needed, as well as information on whether alternatives will be explored to alleviate the impact on the productive and lower-income sectors,” it wrote.

The method of communication was also criticised on social media by Israel Rojas, a member of the popular trova band Beuna Fe, who normally supports the Cuban government.”ETECSA’s ‘rate increase’ is riddled with all the flaws of current Cuban political communication . The technical and objective reasons, even though they are undeniable, end up seeming uncertain, unfair, and erratic,” he wrote.

Responding initially to the widespread concern, President Díaz-Canel wrote on X “We do not like any measure that limits benefits, and it is our duty to thoroughly explain each step taken to avoid the blows of the blockade” 

ETECSA offer special deal for students

At a national level FEU representatives then met with  senior Communist Party figures, the Union of Young Communists (UJC), Government officials, the Higher Education Ministry, and the Federation of Middle Level Education Students (FEEM).

Following the meeting, the FEU issued a statement saying that it had allowed for a “contributory dialogue and important solutions.”

Subsequently, ETCSA said that special arrangements would apply for students. These, it noted, will enable University students to access two top-ups of CUP360 rather than one, to enable them to now access 12 GB of data. Such users according to Tania Velázquez, the Executive President of ETECSA will be registered in the company’s database. She added that other measures will be introduced in educational environments including free access to educational and information sites via the mobile network, Wi-Fi hotspots will be strengthened and increased in universities, and data centres will be established to host scientific journals. Despite this, the measures announced for most Cubans including professionals, pensioners, and others remain in place, effectively restricting internet access for many.

09 June 2025, Issue 1283

 The Caribbean Council is able to provide further detail about all of the stories in Cuba Briefing. If you would like a more detailed insight into any of the content of today’s issue, please get in touch.

Read More

Collapse in sugar production signals new economic crisis for Cuba

26 May 2025

As Cuba’s 2024-25 sugar campaign draws to a close,  provincial reporting, as well as industry sources cited by Reuters, suggest that the island is headed this year for an unplanned for production shortfall of as much as 100,000 metric tons. The outcome is likely to have a negative impact on the Cuban economy.

Although Azcuba originally forecast a harvest of 265,000 metric tons of raw sugar, most analysts now suggest that the island’s sugar sector will be hard pressed to exceed 160,000 metric tons, a figure if eventually confirmed that would rank with the lowest harvest on record since 1898. At its peak in 1989, Cuba produced 8mn tons of raw sugar, becoming one of the world’s largest exporters.

Cuba last published details of its sugar production following the 2022/3 campaign. Then, it reported that 350,000 tons of sugar were produced but has yet to publish details of the size of the 2023/24 harvest. However, earlier this year the widely respected former Minister of Economy, José Luis Rodríguez, indicated in one of his regular economic analyses republished in the country’s official media that the 2023/4 sugar campaign yielded just 160,000 metric tons of raw sugar.

According to reports appearing in various provincial publications, the decline in production is attributable to multiple causes, the most significant being ascribed to the US embargo, fuel shortages, and constant power outages. However, other problems include foreign exchange shortages resulting in a lack of agricultural inputs and spares, breakdowns during grinding, late running repairs, a late start in planting and harvesting, labour shortages caused by internal and external migration, and more generally, a lack of investment and poor management.

The figures reflect recent warnings of a poor outcome. The Minister of Economy and Planning, Joaquín Alonso, told a late April meeting of the Council of Ministers that the current sugar harvest “remains unfavourable.”  Separately, in comments apparently  reflecting the severity of the crisis facing the sector, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dimitri Chernyshenko, speaking following a meeting of the Russia-Cuba Intergovernmental Commission, suggested that Russian investors, would review all possibilities to “save the sugar industry.”

Highlights in this issue: 

  • More detail provided on Russian plan to financially incentivise investment in Cuba
  • Visitor arrivals continue to decline from major markets
  • New US Dollar denominated export financing scheme for Cuban agriculture proposed
  • China reaffirms its strategic collaboration on IT and cybersecurity
  • Export oriented joint venture in pharma products established with Vietnam

The year began badly according to Cuban reporting, with just six out of the fourteen mills expected to grind this year, being operational at the start of January. Since then, even as more mills joined the campaign, the potential crisis facing the sector has continued to be reported on a provincial basis by Cuba’s official daily publications covering Sancti Spíritus, Matanzas, Santiago de Cuba, Las Tunas, and other regions of the country.

The likely shortfall in production is expected to impact negatively on the Cuban economy and place new pressure on the island’s already limited foreign exchange at a time when the country is adapting to a ‘wartime economy’, tourism arrivals and related foreign currency earnings are in decline, food imports are rising,  and public expenditure is being cut. 

Cuba requires about 700,000 metric tons of raw sugar annually, a figure largely met pre-COVID by local production after the sale of  contracted quantities, principally to China. In 2019/20 production stood at 1.3mn tons, but more recently in 2023 to meet domestic requirements, Cuba imported raw sugar valued at US$9.64mn, primarily from Brazil, Colombia, Spain, the US, and Chile.

The probable shortfall this year is likely to have a wider effect in relation to the Cuban sectors that rely on domestically produced sugar and its byproducts, including the island’s premium export grade rums which require only locally produced molasses if they are to meet regulatory requirements.

Other sectors that may also be affected include the island’s potable spirits industry, manufacturers of soft drinks, the island’s health care and scientific research sectors which require pure alcohol, the availability of a byproduct, organic fertiliser used on crops, and ‘honey’ for animal feed. Additionally, sugar cane bagasse is burnt at times to provide power into Cuba’s national electrical system.

Speaking late last year about the future of the sugar sector, Cuba’s Prime Minister, Manuel Marrero, told Cuba’s National Assembly that there was a need to identify innovative solutions to halt the deterioration of the island’s sugar agribusiness in such a way that overall results consider not just the production of sugar, but also its derivatives, the energy produced, and the generation of employment.

How Cuba intends addressing the many structural problems now facing the sector remains unclear, let alone the immediate impact a large shortfall in planned production will have on the macroeconomic problems the island’s government is slowly trying to address.

While foreign investment from Russia in sugar as an agribusiness may offer a way forward if Russian state support and independently  managed private sector operations  can be structured in such a way as to offer a return on capital, it is hard to envisage the sector becoming economically strategic in the near future in the way it once was.

26 May 2025, Issue 1281

 The Caribbean Council is able to provide further detail about all of the stories in Cuba Briefing. If you would like a more detailed insight into any of the content of today’s issue, please get in touch.

Read More
Discover our Subcriptions